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ABSTRACT
In recent years, an increasing number of democratic states,
including fully consolidated, long-standing democratic states, have
adopted laws that impose new restrictions on the ability of civil society
organizations (CSOs) to operate autonomous from government
control, a phenomenon that is unsurprising in authoritarian contexts,
but perplexing in democratic ones. This Article explores this curious
phenomenon, often referred to as the closing space trend, which began
in earnest at the turn of the 21st century, and has been gaining
momentum and intensity ever since. This trend, which has caught the
attention of political scientists, global civil society watchdogs, and
scholars of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has inexplicably
gone unnoticed by legal scholars. Moreover, the non-legal scholars
and watchdogs who track this phenomenon tend to focus exclusively on
the most egregious examples from non-democratic (or weakly
democratic) contexts, such as Russia, Egypt, and China. This Article,
which falls at the intersection of comparative, international, and notfor-profit law, and draws on democratic theory, international relations
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scholarship, and studies of civil society-state relations, attempts to
rectify this glaring gap in the legal literature, in addition to
documenting an aspect of the broader closing space trend that, until
now, has been neglected. It presents novel data and empirical research
on all new legal restrictions adopted by the world’s strongest
democratic states, which this Article carefully defines, from 1990 until
2018. Findings of this Article confirm that the closing space trend is,
in fact, a global phenomenon, one that transcends geography, gross
domestic product (GDP), development status, and most importantly,
one that is not confined only to repressive, non-democratic regimes
known for their distrust of civil society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Civil society, an amorphous term defined in numerous ways, is
primarily composed of organizations established voluntarily by
coalitions of individuals to advance certain shared interests, or to
address common concerns, which can include virtually anything with
the exception of profit-making. 1 Civil society organizations (CSOs),
the so-called third sector wedged between the state and the market,
include advocacy organizations, student groups, cultural and sports
clubs, social movements, community associations, philanthropic
foundations, religious organizations, professional associations, labor
unions, chambers of commerce, and informal voluntary groups, among
others. 2 They include Human Rights Watch, Doctors without Borders,
1. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)
IN THE UNITED STATES (2017); see JONAS WOLFF & ANNIKA E. POPPE, PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE FRANKFURT, FROM CLOSING SPACE TO CONTESTED SPACES: RE-ASSESSING
CURRENT CONFLICTS OVER INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT 5 (2015); see generally
FERGUSON, supra note 1.

2. Civil Society Organizations (“CSOs”) and Non-Governmental Organizations
(“NGOs”) are often used synonymously or interchangeably. However, CSO is a broader,
umbrella term, while NGO is more specific: it is just one type among many types of CSOs. This
Article’s research intends to focus on this broader category of not-for-profit groups that lie
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Parent-Teacher Associations, and community babysitting clubs, in
addition to the Ku Klux Klan, the Alt-Right, and the United Aryan
Front. 3 Perhaps the only thing that unites this disparate array of
organizations is what they are not: they are non-governmental and notfor-profit. 4 Though their work often overlaps with the state and the
market, and their collaboration with both sectors is typical, their
autonomy from both spheres, particularly the state, is what makes
CSOs distinct. 5
Yet, in an increasing number of countries around the globe,
representing all regime types, in all regions, with all levels of economic
and military strength, civil society’s autonomy from the state is being
slowly chipped, and in some cases entirely stripped, away. 6 While this
erosion of civil society’s autonomy is accomplished in a variety of
ways, many of which are illegal and extralegal in nature, including
assaults, murders, stigmatization campaigns, and bureaucratic
harassment, an increasingly popular tool used by government actors to
restrict CSOs’ independence is the law. Through the passage of
legislation that imposes new restrictions on the ability of CSOs to
outside both the government and corporate sectors; as such `the Author has chosen to use the
term CSO.
3. See Thomas Carothers, Civil Society: Think Again, FOREIGN POL’Y, 18, 19-20 (2000).
4. See Audie Klotz, Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The AntiApartheid and Abolitionist Experiences, 8 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 49, 50 (2002); RISSE-KAPPEN,
THOMAS, ED. BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS,
DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (1995).
5. See generally EDUARDO SZAZI, NGOS: LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2012); INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW & WORLD MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
SECRETARIAT AT THE NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, DEFENDING CIVIL SOCIETY
REPORT n.1 (2012).
6. See GODFREY MUSILA, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM UNDER THREAT: THE SPREAD
OF ANTI-NGO MEASURES IN AFRICA 9 (2019); ANDREW CUNNINGHAM & STEVE TIBBET, INT’L
COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, SCOPING STUDY ON CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE
HUMANITARIAN ACTION 1 (2018); KENDRA DUPUY ET AL., NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY
SECTOR QUARTERLY, DO DONORS REDUCE BILATERAL AID TO COUNTRIES WITH
RESTRICTIVE NGO LAWS? A PANEL STUDY, 1993-2012 100 (2017) [hereinafter DUPUY et al.,
PANEL STUDY]; 84 KENDRA DUPUY ET AL., WORLD DEVELOPMENT, HANDS OFF MY REGIME!
GOV’T’S RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN AID TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGS. IN POOR AND
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 306 (2016) [hereinafter DUPUY et al., HANDS OFF MY REGIME];
Dupuy et al., Who Survived? Ethiopia’s Regulatory Crackdown on Foreign-Funded NGOs,
REV. INT’L POL. ECON., Apr. 10, 2014, at 1 [hereinafter DUPUY et al., WHO SURVIVED];
Douglas Rutzen, Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism, 17 INT’L J. OF NOTFOR-PROFIT L. 1, 6 (2015) [hereinafter Rutzen 2015]; THOMAS CAROTHERS & SASKIA
BRECHENMACHER, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, CLOSING SPACE: DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUPPORT UNDER FIRE 1 (2014) [hereinafter CAROTHERS &
BRECHENMACHER 2014].
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operate free from excessive government scrutiny and control, what this
Article refers to as restrictive CSO laws, governmental actors are
gaining greater control over the non-governmental, not-for-profit
sector and in ways that benefit from the veneer of legality. Not only are
such laws appearing in countries where they might be expected—
Azerbaijan, Burundi, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Russia, Zimbabwe, and
countries throughout the Middle East. 7 Interestingly, they are also
appearing in democratic states too, including strong, fully consolidated
democratic states that have historically supported a vibrant and
independent civil society sector: Canada, India, New Zealand, Spain,
Israel, Hungary, Poland, and the United States, just to name a few. 8
Restrictive CSO laws, which are perhaps unsurprising in
authoritarian-leaning states, are puzzling in the context of democratic
ones, which have historically been the primary defenders, funders, and
champions of a robust and independent civil society. 9 Democracies, by
definition, are polities created by and for the citizens that comprise
them. 10 To ensure that the people rather than a single party or individual
leader control their nation’s destiny, democratic states, typically by
constitutional design, grant their citizens the rights to freedom of
expression, association and assembly, all of which are inherent in the

7. See INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, CIVIC FREEDOM MONITOR (2019),
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/index.html [https://perma.cc/5MM3-LREW], for reports
on these countries which detail the legal frameworks for civil society.
8. See Chrystie Swiney, Undemocratic Civil Society Laws are Appearing in
Democracies,
OPENGLOBALRIGHTS
(Mar.
28,
2019),
https://www.openglobalrights.org/undemocratic-civil-society-laws-are-appearing-indemocracies-too/ [https://perma.cc/EH95-E3X3]; Chrystie Swiney, Laws are Chipping Away at
Democracy
Around
the
World,
THE
CONVERSATION
(Apr.
2,
2019),
https://theconversation.com/laws-are-chipping-away-at-democracy-around-the-world-113089
[https://perma.cc/RW9Y-TJA6]. Poland adopted a restrictive CSO law in October 2017 and
Hungary adopted one in June 2017. Though both could be characterized as unconsolidating in
recent years, both are characterized as “full” democracies according to the Polity IV project, a
highly-respected and frequently cited database relied on by many political scientists. Both
countries have received the highest score (a 10) on Polity’s scale since 1990 (for Hungary) and
2003 (Poland), which means that qualify as the highest form of democracy, a “full” democracy.
9. See, e.g., Staff of S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong., Rep. on
Nongovernmental Organizations and Democracy Promotion: Giving Voice to the People 73
(Comm. Print 2006).
10. See
HARVARD
UNIV.,
DEFINING
DEMOCRACY,
https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Democracy1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6BVKPLX7]. There are of course many different measures and definitions of democracy, which can
alter depending on the particular type of democracy that one is speaking of: constitutional
democracy, liberal democracy, representative democracy, etc.
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right to form into voluntary non-governmental groups. 11 This ability of
individuals to form into independent groups on the basis of shared
concerns or interests is essential for the upholding of democracy; such
groups are essential to holding elected leaders to account and ensuring
that the voices and opinions of the people, especially the marginalized
and destitute, are heard. 12 Individuals, acting on their own, are typically
powerless and voiceless in the face of the modern nation-state, which
holds the monopoly on force and unmatched access to resources.13
Without the ability for individuals to coalesce together, to unite their
voices and resources, a democratic state can easily morph into an
authoritarian-like state where the people’s will is forgotten. 14 Civil
society, the third sector, helps to ensure that the people’s will is both
heard and taken into account by their leaders, who theoretically and by
constitutional design rule on their behalf. 15 In short, a genuinely
independent civil society sector is essential to the maintenance and
health of any democracy. 16
For civil society to play its democracy-maintaining role, arguably
its core function, it must be independent, as previously stated; this is
key. Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, which are
among the world’s most authoritarian countries, all claim to have a civil
society sector. 17 This might be true, but these sectors are almost entirely
without independence and autonomy from the state; if they exist at all,
they are under the near exclusive control of the state, leaving them as

11. United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, Freedom of
Peaceful Assembly and Association.
12. See Emily von Sydow, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CITIZEN’S SHORTCUT
TO THE EU, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 4 (2013) (arguing that “civil
society . . . is an essential pillar of democracy.”).
13. See generally MAX WEBER, WEBER’S RATIONALISM AND MODERN SOCIETY (Tony
Waters & Dagmar Waters ed., 2015).
14. This was one of the many claims made by French historian Alexis d’ Tocqueville
after conducting a study on why democracy in the United States took root and developed so
robustly. His conclusion: a strong commitment to free association. His findings and observations
are contained in his renown book, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
15. Open Society and ICNL, Defending Civil Society, 2nd Ed. (June 2012), available at
http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/DCS_Report_Second_Edition_English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MTT2-F44J].
16. Maina Kiai, Maina, UN Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, A/HRC/20/27 (2012).
17. See Gavin Haines, Mapped: The World’s Most (and Least) Free Countries, THE
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/the-worlds-mostauthoritarian-destinations/ [https://perma.cc/6YTV-ADFF].
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mere appendages or mouthpieces of the state’s agenda. 18 Without legal
guarantees and protections securely in place protecting the
independence of the civil society sector, CSOs easily succumb to cooptation, manipulation, or all out eradication by the state, as has
happened in a variety of non-democratic states in recent years, such as
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and in parts of
China. 19 Though less restrictive than their counterparts in nondemocratic countries, the accelerating appearance of restrictive CSO
laws in historically strong democratic states, and in a relatively short
period of time, as documented in the empirical results presented below,
is a perplexing and growing concern among civil society activists,
democracy observers, and a small, but growing number of scholars. 20
Strangely, this phenomenon, which requires concerned observers
and scholars to engage in close textual analysis of specific laws and
bills, and understand both comparative law and international human
rights law, has largely eluded the legal academy and legal scholarship,
until now. Given that this topic falls at the intersection of international,
comparative and not-for-profit law, but also relies on theories from
international relations and democracy studies, it is crucial that not only
political scientists, civil society observers, and democracy theorists be
involved in assessing its implications and future trajectory, but perhaps
most importantly, legal scholars, who are uniquely equipped with the
tools, background, and skills necessary to accurately assess this global
trend. This Article is an attempt to rectify this glaring gap in the

18. Both the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law and CIVICUS track civil society
related developments in virtually all countries around the world. Individual reports for each
country, between the two of them, can be accessed. These reports can confirm the lack of civil
society or the lack of independence pertaining to the civil society sectors in these countries. This
is less true of Ethiopia than the other countries cited.
19. See Democratic Republic of Congo, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo
[https://perma.cc/KR7A-GHSN;
Carolyn Hsu et al., The State of NGOs in China Today, BROOKINGS (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/12/15/the-state-of-ngos-in-china-today/
[https://perma.cc/X9JV-EHBJ]; Paul Kariuki, Citizens and Civil Society Must Fight to Protect
our Democracy, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2019), https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-05-00citizens-and-civil-society-must-fight-to-protect-our-democracy [https://perma.cc/4AC2-827J].
20. See Anthony J. DeMattee, Covenants, Constitutions, and Distinct Law Types:
Investigating Governments’ Restrictions on CSOs Using an Institutional Approach, 30
VOLUNTAS: INT’L J. OF VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 1229-55 (2019); Suparna Chaudhry,
The Assault on Democracy Assistance: Explaining State Repression of NGOs (Dec. 2016)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University); DUPUY et al., PANEL STUDY, supra note 6.

406

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:2

existing legal scholarship on a global legal phenomenon with profound
consequences for the state of democracy around the world. 21
More specifically, this Article attempts to fully map and document
the spread of restrictive civil society laws in historically strong,
consolidated democratic states, which will be carefully defined below.
Part II of this Article explores what precisely is meant by restrictive
civil society laws or restrictive CSO laws as they will be referred to
throughout this Article, 22 and includes specific examples, as well as a
taxonomy for defining the various types of existing restrictive laws.
Part III examines the Associational Revolution of the 1990s, a time
period when CSOs were thought to reach their apex in terms of
popularity, funding, and growth, due in large part to their embrace by
democratic states, the victors of the Cold War, as trustworthy vessels
for spreading and entrenching democratic values around the globe. This
earlier revolution is then juxtaposed in Part IV with the CounterAssociational Revolution, most commonly referred to as the Closing
Space Trend by civil society scholars and activists. This trend refers to
the reversal of fortunes for CSOs around the world beginning in the
early part of the twenty-first century, which is attributed to a variety of
factors, including the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York
City and the resulting global war against terrorism, the rising number
of large scale protest movements that resulted in the overthrow of
entrenched regimes (which were blamed on CSOs), and a growing
concern that foreigners were undermining and corrupting domestic
CSOs. 23 Part V carefully defines the key terms and distinctions that
were essential in this Article’s empirical analysis (e.g., restrictive CSO
law and strong democratic state), which is presented in Part VI. Part
VII tackles the fundamental question of why we should care about
CSOs, and the legal frameworks that undergird them, and what role
they play in the preservation and health of democratic states. Part VIII
21. As previously stated, this phenomenon—the stripping away of the autonomy and
independence of civil society organizations in democratic states—has applications that are not
only legal in nature. In addition to be negatively impacted by the passage of restrictive laws,
CSOs suffer from harassment by governmental actors, intimidation and stigmatization
campaigns, the withdrawal of privileges, abusive manipulations and distortions of existing laws,
and a variety of additional illegal and extralegal mechanisms.
22. This Article’s focus is on civil society organizations in particular, which is why the
Article focuses on CSO laws specifically. Note, however, that the term civil society is, in reality,
much broader in scope. It includes individual activists and amorphous movements that have no
real organizational presence, such as the #MeToo Movement.
23. See Rutzen 2015, supra note 6.
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presents the conclusions and implications that can be drawn from the
data that is presented, as well as areas in need of additional and further
research. This Article fills important and glaring gaps in the existing
literature on the spread of legal restrictions on CSOs throughout the
globe and, in so doing, introduces a critical topic to legal scholarship
that is in dire and immediate need of further examination by legal
scholars specifically.
II. RESTRICTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY LAWS
A. Types of Legal Restrictions on CSOs
While restrictive CSO laws vary in scope, intensity, and content,
they share a common goal at their core: the extension of additional
governmental control over the non-governmental sector. Restrictive
CSO laws are defined more by their outcome than their particular labels
or precise contents, although specific provisions can be and are a way
of identifying them, as further explored below. These laws, however
they are labeled or categorized, 24 which widely varies, result in a
reduction in the level of independence among the non-governmental,
non-profit sector, which as previously discussed is, by definition,
intended to be and remain independent. 25 Put another way, restrictive
CSO laws transfer additional and new levels of control and oversight
over the civil society sector to government actors, though in many cases
only certain parts of the overall sector are affected, such as
24. These laws cannot be located by title, as they widely vary around the globe. In some
countries, CSOs are referred to as non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), but in many, if
not most countries, NGOs are only one among a wide variety of CSOs, which is why this Article
prefers the much broader, umbrella term CSOs over NGOs. Many laws are specific to certain
types of CSOs, such as charities, foundations, sports clubs, religious organizations, membershipbased organizations, etc. Other laws are general in scope and label them all together, under a
broad term such as the non-governmental sector. This is why determining which laws to include
in the Author’s review was, and is, very tricky, and why this Article focuses more on the outcome
and intention of these laws then their labels, titles or even specific contents (though again,
contents were certainly instrumental to the analysis).
25. Different scholars and practitioners have different ways of labeling restrictive CSO
laws. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (“ICNL”), for example, which is one of
the global leaders in tracking CSO laws, labels and identifies them in one way; while CIVICUS
and Freedom House tend to refer to them using slightly different language. Scholars also employ
different labels and terms, which can make it difficult to cross-compare research findings and
conclusions. As a former contractor for ICNL, the Author tends to adopt their labeling, which
the Author also trusts due to ICNL’s depth of experience and knowledge on this topic. The term
lifecycle law in particular, is borrowed from ICNL’s vocabulary.
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environmental organizations, advocacy groups, or non-profit health
providers. These new exertions of governmental authority implicate
CSOs’ ability to freely form, operate, access funding, especially
foreign funding, engage in certain activities, and dissolve. 26
B. Examples of Restrictive CSO Laws
Some recent examples, of what one study referred to as the
governmentalizing of non-governmental organizations through the
adoption of new types of restrictive CSO laws, will help to elucidate
the points made above. 27
1. Hungary
In June of 2018, Hungary’s parliament adopted a package of laws,
colloquially referred to as the “Stop Soros laws” due to their specific
targeting of philanthropist George Soros, who supported a variety of
pro-immigrant NGOs in Hungary at the time. 28 This package of laws
imposed a variety of onerous new restrictions on CSOs, including a tax
for those organizations suspected of assisting migrants, new criminal
penalties for organizations (and individuals) associated with
facilitating the entry of asylum seekers, and additional new authorities
given to government agencies to register, penalize, and ban
organizations who support “illegal immigration,” which can include
distributing informational materials or helping refugees fill out asylum
requests. 29 A multitude of international human rights organizations,
migrant groups, multilateral organizations, UN officials, and civil
society activists condemned the passage of these “draconian” laws and

26. See generally Anthony J. DeMattee, Toward a Coherent Framework: A Typology and
Conceptualization of CSO Regulatory Regimes, 9 NONPROFIT POLICY FORUM, 1-17 (2019)
(discussing the existence of restrictive and permissive rules pertaining to the non-profit sector);
ANTHONY J. DEMATTEE & CHRYSTIE SWINEY, CLOSING SPACE OR CHANGING SPACE? THE
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING THE STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP (2020).
27. See DAVID CRAIG & DOUG PORTER, DEVELOPMENT BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM?:
GOVERNANCE, POVERTY REDUCTION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 14 (2006).
28. Bill No. T/333 amending certain laws relating to measures to combat illegal
immigration. This package of laws includes three laws: The law on the social responsibility of
organizations supporting illegal migration; the Law on Immigration Financing Duty; and the
Law on Immigration Restraints, all adopted in June 2018.
29. See Reuters in Budapest, Hungary Passes Anti-Immigrant ‘Stop Soros’ Laws, THE
GUARDIAN (Jun. 20, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/hungary-passesanti-immigrant-stop-soros-laws [https://perma.cc/TPQ7-A3GM].

2019]

COUNTER-ASSOCIATIONAL REVOLUTION

409

called for their immediate repeal. 30 Similarly, a year before, in June of
2017, Hungary passed a new law, which many compare to Russia’s
restrictive 2012 Foreign Agent Law, requiring CSOs that receive
approximately $28,000 or more of their funding from abroad, no matter
the source, to label themselves as “funded from abroad” on all
publications. 31 This label, in the Hungarian context, is extremely
stigmatizing and degrading to the sub-sector of CSOs that it most
directly impacts, which include advocacy organizations that focus on
exposing government corruption and human and civil rights abuses.32
Similar laws were passed in Israel in 2016 and India in 2010, the latter
of which has had devastating consequences for many CSOs,
particularly human rights and environmental CSOs. 33
2. India
In India, the 2010 Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, which
was amended to impose additional restrictions in 2015, requires CSOs
to apply for and to receive explicit governmental permission before
receiving any funds from abroad, whether from governmental or
private sources. The government can deny permission for vague and
broad reasons such as “activities not conducive to the [country’s]
national interest.” This law has been routinely used to place CSOs on

30. See Hungary: Draconian Anti-NGO Law Will be Resisted Every Step of the Way,
AMNESTY INT’L (Jun. 20, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/hungarydraconian-anti-ngo-law-will-be-resisted-every-step-of-the-way/
[https://perma.cc/8XSRAUEE]; Pablo Gorondi, Council of Europe Experts: Hungary Must Repeal Anti-NGO Law,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jun.
22,
2018),
https://apnews.com/c17c31c322e74a12b507ca6e939c66ac/Council-of-Europe-experts:Hungary-must-repeal-anti-NGO-law[ https://perma.cc/2F4R-MD8Q]
31. Transparency Bill Act (LXXVI of 2017), adopted in June 2017.
32. See generally Yasmeen Serhan, Hungary’s Anti-Foreign NGO Law, THE ATLANTIC,
(June 13, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/hungarys-anti-foreign-ngolaw/530121/ [https://perma.cc/RR9V-ZE23]; Christian Keszthelyi, President Áder Signs NGO
Law
into
Effect,
BUDAPEST
BUSINESS
JOURNAL,
(June
16,
2017),
https://bbj.hu/politics/president-ader-signs-ngo-law-into-effect_134436
[https://perma.cc/2V8P-LHHJ].
33. Melissa Cyrill & Adam Pitman, FCRA Compliance in India: How 24,000 NGOs Lost
Their License, INDIA BRIEFING NEWS, (September 28, 2017), https://www.indiabriefing.com/news/fcra-compliance-india-how-24000-ngos-lost-their-license-15287.html/
[https://perma.cc/7LHG-MYXK]; Jonathan Lis, Despite Global Criticism, Israel Approves
Contentious ‘NGO Law’, HAARETZ (July 11, 2016), https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/israel-passes-contentious-ngo-bill-into-law-1.5408907 [https://perma.cc/36WS-A763].
Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014, the 2010 law has reportedly been used
to strip over 24,000 CSOs of their operating licenses, a number that continues to increase.
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government watch lists, strip CSOs of their operating licenses, and
force them to voluntarily dissolve. 34
3. The United States
In the United States in 2017, a policy was adopted requiring
foreign CSOs that provide health care services to women and children
to first sign a pledge promising not to perform any abortion-related
activities, including those that involve educational opportunities or
counseling, in order to receive any amount of US health aid. 35 This
requirement has had a significant chilling effect on many NGOs that
provide healthcare to impoverished families around the world and are
dependent, for their existence, on US foreign aid. 36 According to one
affected NGO, this policy, which not only implicates sexual and
reproductive health services, including abortion, but also affects the
provision of nutrition and maternal health services and the ability to
reach a sub-sector of women who are victims of gender-based violence,
is “literally killing women.” 37 A study by the Kaiser Family Foundation
found that at least 1,275 foreign NGOs and nearly 500 US NGOs have
been negatively impacted, and specifically, their speech and activities
curtailed, by this US policy. 38

34. Cyrill & Pitman, supra note 32.
35. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Trump’s ‘Mexico City Policy’ or ‘Global
Gag Rule.’: Questions and Answers. (2018), [https://perma.cc/LTG5-S4AQ]. Under the
expanded Mexico City Policy, described as the “global gag rule” passed by previous republican
administrations but this time “on steroids,” adopted by President Trump in January of 2017,
foreign CSOs wishing to receive any amount of global US health funding, must first sign a
pledge promising to not engage in any abortion-related activities whatsoever, including
counseling or education.
36. See generally Vanessa Rios, Crisis in Care: Year Two Impact of Trump’s Global Gag
Rule, INT. WOMEN’S HEALTH COALITION (2019).
37. Amy Lieberman, Two Years in, Report Finds ‘global Gag Rule’ Cuts Access to
Health Care, DEVEX, (June 5, 2019), https://www.devex.com/news/two-years-in-report-findsglobal-gag-rule-cuts-access-to-health-care-95046 [https://perma.cc/S7WF-9CLE].
38. See generally Kellie Moss & Jennifer Kates, “How Many Foreign NGOs Are Subject
to the Expanded Mexico City Policy?” KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (2017),
https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/issue-brief/how-many-foreign-ngos-are-subject-tothe-expanded-mexico-city-policy/ [https://perma.cc/YV4S-MXSS]. In addition to the expanded
Mexico City Policy, thirty-five US states have proposed or adopted 100 laws imposing new
restrictions on individuals’ and CSOs’ ability to protest in the past three years. See the US
PROTEST LAW TRACKER, International Center for Not-for-Profit, available at
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/ [https://perma.cc/TM7Z-LAZ6] (last accessed June 6,
2019).
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4. Poland
In October of 2017, the Polish parliament approved a law that
consolidates all power over CSO funding into the hands of a single
individual appointed by the Prime Minister. This government
appointee, the Director of the National Institute of Freedom, now holds
vast decision-making power over the distribution of CSO funding. 39
Under the new law, government actors now dictate which CSOs receive
funding, and at what levels, effectively giving them the ultimate power
over which CSOs survive, thrive, or dissolve. 40 Many fear that this is
transforming the previously independent civil society sector in Poland
into a passive and fearful appendage of the Polish Government that
only parrots the government’s agenda in an attempt to secure state
funding, which is essential for their organizational existence. 41
5. Australia
In 2014, civil society organizations (“CSOs”) caring for refugees
in Australia, including Save the Children and the Red Cross, were
asked by the Australian Government to pay multimillion-dollar bonds,
or “performance securities,” to continue their work. 42 These CSOs
39. See generally State Department Urged to Press Duda to Veto Harmful Legislation,
Protect
Polish
NGOs,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
FIRST
(Oct.
5,
2017),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/state-dept-urged-press-poland-judicial-reformlaw-0 [https://perma.cc/8LWL-GUDQ]. While some CSOs, particularly certain types of CSOs
such as human rights and other advocacy organizations operating in countries inhospitable to
the causes they are advocating, have historically relied on government funding for their
existence, and while this implicates a debate about the genuine independence of such
organizations, what this Article focused on here are not government funds, which a CSO can
voluntarily choose to apply for and receive, but laws that attempt to control the distribution of
funding to CSOs altogether (including from non-governmental sources) and that require all or
certain kinds of funds meant for CSOs, such as foreign funds, to first flow through the
government, which then gets to decide which CSOs get access to the funding and by how much.
This type of law would constitute a “restrictive CSO law” for this purposes, rather than a law
dictating how a CSO could apply for and receive government funding, which in the Author’s
view, preserves and maintains a CSO’s autonomy.
40. Jonathan Day, Poland Seizes Control of Civil Society Funding, LIBERTIES (Dec. 13,
2017),
https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/poland-ngo-law-funding/13783
[https://perma.cc/AM9Q-2ZED].
41. See generally Goran Buldioski, EU Must Confront Poland and Hungary. EU
OBSERVER (Nov. 21, 2017), https://euobserver.com/opinion/139942 [https://perma.cc/ZUJ9GQQB].
42. Adam Morton, Buying Silence? Immigration Asked Charities for Multimillion-Dollar
Bond,
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD
(Oct.
30,
2015),
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/buying-silence-immigration-asked-charities-formultimilliondollar-bond-20151030-gkmspv.html [https://perma.cc/SHB8-686N].
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were then warned that if they publically spoke out against the
government’s immigration policies without first seeking approval, their
bonds could be forfeited, effectively buying their silence. 43 Save the
Children refused to pay the bond, arguing that it was effectively a gag
order, which is illegal under Australia law. 44 As a result, they lost their
government contract and were eventually forced to end their work on
the island of Naru, where Australia houses its refugees under
controversial conditions. 45 Upon their departure, the head of Save the
Children remarked that “[i]ncreasingly, what we’ve seen both here in
Australia and around the world is what I would describe as a significant
diminishing of civil society’s ability to speak” and act in ways that were
acceptable in the past. 46
Also in Australia, in June of 2018, the Australian parliament
passed the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill, which bans
donations from foreign sources not only for political parties, but also
for those classified as political campaigners. 47 Charities and unions
were exempted from this provision after a spirited campaign and the
onslaught of domestic and international criticism that the law received,
but other types of CSOs not registered as either a charity or a union are
theoretically still covered by this new restrictive law. Australian CSOs
are extremely worried about this unpopular bill, which has been
described as “startling” in scope and as expected to have an “adverse
impact on many organizations.” 48
6. Italy
In Italy, after a restrictive law was adopted by the government in
2018, various humanitarian CSOs dedicated to rescuing migrants
trying to traverse the Mediterranean Sea without adequate protection
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Soon thereafter, a for-profit entity, Transfield Services, signed a contract with the
government, taking over the roles previously performed by Save the Children, after agreeing to
the government’s “gag clause” and paying the associated bond. The head of Save the Children
announced, upon their departure from Nauru, that “[i]ncreasingly, what we’ve seen both here in
Australia and around the world is what I would describe as a significant diminishing of civil
society’s ability to speak out” Id.
46. Id.
47. Paul Karp, Coalition Bill to Ban Foreign Political Donations Passes Senate, THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
15,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2018/nov/15/coalition-bill-to-ban-foreign-political-donations-passes-senate
[https://perma.cc/DY7J-WGEM].
48. Id.
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along the Italian coast had their rescue vessels impounded, their staffs
investigated for human trafficking, and their assets frozen after
attempting to help undocumented immigrants safely come to shore.49
Under the new law, broad additional new powers are transferred to the
interior ministry, which is empowered to confiscate CSO owned and
operated boats involved in search and rescue operations and to fine
their captains up to one million dollars in penalty fees. 50 The UN, and
other human rights observers, have warned that this new law threatens
to criminalize and stigmatize life-saving humanitarian work. 51
7. Austria
A 2015 law in Austria bans Islamic organizations and only Islamic
organizations—from accessing any foreign funds whatsoever, from
engaging in any fundraising efforts outside the country, from using any
version of the Quran other than the state-approved version, which is in
German, and from espousing any opinions that contradict “a positive
fundamental view towards [Austria’s] state and society.” 52 In June
2018, Austria’s right-wing government, which came to power in
December 2017, announced its plans to shut down seven mosques and
expel up to 60 imams for violating the restrictive and vague provisions
of this bill. 53
These are just a few of the many examples of restrictive CSO laws
adopted in historically strong democratic states in recent years, as
further discussed below in Part VI. Specifically, Section VI presents
the findings of the Author’s in-depth empirical review of the legal
frameworks for CSOs in each of the world’s fifty-nine highest-ranking
49. Lysa John, Government Attacks on Humanitarian Organizations and Human Rights
Rising, DEVEX (June 6, 2019), https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-government-attacks-onhumanitarian-organizations-and-human-rights-rising-94961 [https://perma.cc/W8SG-GJV4].
50. See Angela Giuffrida, Italian Government Approves Salvini Bill Targeting Migrants,
THE GUARDIAN, (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/24/italiangovernment-approves-bill-anti-migrant-measures-matteo-salvini
[https://perma.cc/H6HGH453].
51. Emma R., UN Warns Italy Over Tough Rescue Ship Law, Demanding ‘Humanitarian
Work’ Not Be Criminalized or Stigmatized, VOICE OF EUROPE, (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://voiceofeurope.com/2019/08/un-warns-italy-over-tough-rescue-ship-law-demandinghumanitarian-work-not-be-criminalized-or-stigmatized/ [https://perma.cc/EW92-BKMR].
52. Amendment to the 1912 Law on Islam.
53. Austria to Shut Down Mosques, Expel Foreign-funded Imams, REUTERS, (June 8,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-politics-islam/austria-to-shut-downmosques-expel-foreign-funded-imams-idUSKCN1J40X1 [https://perma.cc/RJU8-EN8J].
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democracies. 54 As will be revealed, the Author’s findings confirm that
the closing space trend is, in fact, a global phenomenon, one that
transcends geography, wealth, and development status, and most
importantly, one that is not confined only to repressive, non-democratic
regimes, as is typically assumed.
III. THE ASSOCIATIONAL REVOLUTION
A.

The End of the Cold War, Democracy’s Victory, and the Rise of
CSOs

The seemingly contagious global phenomenon, whereby one state
after another adopts legislation (which is often similar in content)
restricting the autonomy of the non-profit sector while transferring
additional oversight powers to the government, began in earnest
following the turn of the twenty-first century and has been gaining
momentum and intensity ever since. 55 This evolving phenomenon
seems to be a direct response to the “associational revolution” of the
1990s, which saw CSOs’ numbers, influence, and ability to shape
international and domestic politics escalate to new heights. 56 The end
of the Cold War unleashed a surge of interest and support, and therefore
resources, toward CSOs, which were viewed by the democracy-touting
victors of the Cold War as trustworthy vehicles for proselytizing and
institutionalizing the virtues of democracy worldwide. 57 The global rise
and spread of CSOs, along with the Internet, the defeat of communism,
the rise of political and economic liberalization, and advancements in
communication and information technology, were together hailed as
ushering in a hopeful new “era of civic empowerment,” whereby
private citizens, acting in coalition outside of the state apparatus, would

54. For the full list of countries examined, see Appendix 1.
55. See generally Maria Stephan, Responding to the Global Threat of Closing Civic
Space: Policy Options, US INST. OF PEACE (2017); See generally ALEX TIERSKY & EMILY
RENARD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, CLOSING SPACE: RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL
SOCIETY AROUND THE WORLD AND U.S. RESPONSES (2016); See generally WOLFF & POPPE,
supra note 1.
56. See generally THE POWER AND LIMITS OF NGOS (Sarah Mendelson & John Glenn,
eds., 2002); See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50–66.
57. See generally RICHARD LUGAR, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: GIVING VOICE TO THE PEOPLE, A REPORT TO MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE 109TH CONGRESS, 2ND
SESSION (2006).
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be able to participate alongside governmental and for-profit actors in
shaping their destinies in the new millennium. 58
CSOs fully seized this hopeful moment in their history: they
proliferated domestically and internationally, successfully fought for
involvement in traditionally state-based international organizations,
and inserted themselves at all levels of global and domestic politics.59
As the twenty-first century completed its first decade, the number of
domestic CSOs had increased over 500 percent in over fifty countries,
and in many countries, this number reflected a twenty-fold increase.60
The number of international CSOs similarly escalated exponentially, 61
as did their level of participation alongside states in global UN
conferences and other typically state-led events. 62 By 2016, the growth
of new international CSOs (by sheer numbers) was significantly
outpacing that of formal state-led international organizations and
coalitions whose growth and productivity stagnated. 63 The
extraordinary rise in the number and visibility of CSOs around the
58. See generally Douglas Rutzen, Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic
Protectionism, 17 INT. J. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW 2 (2015) [hereinafter Rutzen Not-forProfit].
59. See generally Sudarsana Kundu, Women’s Rights Struggle as Restrictions Deepen
Globally.
DIPLOMATIC
COURIER
(Sept.
20,
2017),
https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/womens-rights-struggle-restrictions-deepen-globally
[https://perma.cc/4B8M-3JYR]. See generally Charli Carpenter, Vetting the Advocacy Agenda:
Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms, 65 INT. ORG. 69–102 (2011); See Brian
Greenhill, The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human
Rights Norms, 54 INT. STUD. Q. 127-45 (2010).
60. AMANDA MURDIE, HELP OR HARM: THE HUMAN SECURITY EFFECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL NGOS 5 (2014).
61. SZAZI, supra note 5, at 27.
62. See Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, & Kathryn Hochstetler, The Sovereign
Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences
on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women. 51 WORLD POL. 1-35 (1998). Based on Article
71 of the UN Charter, NGOs are permitted to apply for consultative status within the UN’s
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In the first year that the accreditation system was
operational, in 1948, only four NGOs were accredited; in 1993, this number rose to 418; and
today, over 4,500 NGOs are accredited (see the UN’s NGO Branch website:
http://csonet.org/?menu=100 [https://perma.cc/5ME3-94WM]). One can also trace the rising
influence of NGOs in international politics by examining the number of NGOs permitted to
participate in the UN’s global conferences. In 1975, the number of accredited NGOs permitted
to participate in the Women’s was 114; in 1985, it was 163; and by 1995, it reached 3,000 (Clark,
Friedman, & Hochstetler 1998). According to the UN Commission on the Status of women:
“NGOs have been influential in shaping the current global policy framework on women’s
empowerment and gender equality: the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action” (UN
Commission on the Status of Women 2017).
63. Kenneth W. Abbott, Jessica F. Green & Robert O. Keohane, Organizational Ecology
and Institutional Change in Global Governance, 70 INT’L ORG. 247, 249-50 (2016).
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globe lead certain political scientists to notice “a dramatic shift in the
institutional landscape” of global politics, with non-state actors,
notably including CSOs, playing larger and more consequential roles
in shaping the international political agenda. 64 In the heyday of the
associational revolution, some even referred to CSOs as rising nonstate “second superpowers,” 65 which were ushering in a significant
“power shift” in global politics whereby the “steady concentration of
power in the hands [of states that] began with the Peace of Westphalia,
is over, at least for a while.” 66
B. CSOs’ Rising Global Influence, Visibility and Spread
1. At the Domestic Level
CSOs’ numerical growth has indeed translated into increased
influence and power at both the domestic and international levels. At
the domestic level, CSOs have proven capable of compelling states to
make important policy and legal changes—to institutionalize domestic
watchdog institutions, 67 adopt certain policies, 68 enact and rescind
specific laws, 69 and amend long-standing constitutional provisions70—
and inspiring large-scale social movements that lead to radical shifts in
deeply-entrenched political and cultural norms. 71 They have held
64.
65.

Id. at 4.
James F. Moore, The Second Superpower Rears Its Beautiful Head, in EXTREME
DEMOCRACY 37, 37 (Jon Lebkowsky & Mitch Ratcliffe eds., 2005), at 37, available at
http://www.extremedemocracy.com/chapters/Chapter%20Two-Moore.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HR7H-AT7E].
66. Mathews, supra note 54, at 50.
67. See Kim Dongwook, International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global
Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions, 67 INT’L ORG. 505, 506 (2013).
68. See Amanda Murdie & Alexander Hicks, Can International Nongovernmental
Organizations Boost Government Services? The Case of Health, 67 INT’L ORG. 541, 545-47
(2013) [hereinafter Murdie & Hicks 2013].
69. See Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, Lost in Translation? Nonstate Actors
and the Transnational Movement of Procedural Law, 67 INT’L ORG. 725, 732 (2013).
70. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO
MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Part 1 on “Marriage Equality,” Chapters 1-6 (2016).
71. The United States alone provides many examples. Environmental CSOs in the United
States sparked the environmental movement in the 1980s, and CSOs were also instrumental in
catalyzing and leading the campaign to franchise women, the civil rights movement, and the
marriage equality campaign, among others. Although arguably not as successful, the Black Lives
Matter campaign has led to many legal and regulatory changes that have increased oversight and
accountability of police officers, such as requirements for video camera installation in police
cars. According to Lester Salamon, who wrote a landmark article on the rise of the non-profit
sector in Foreign Affairs in 1994, “[v]irtually all of America’s major social movements, for
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governments to account when citizens acting on their own, treaty
commitments, foreign states, and international organizations did not or
could not, 72 and they have repeatedly named and shamed states into
making important policy and political changes, such as withdrawing
from colonial territories, 73 replacing long-standing incumbents,74
ending the institution of slavery, 75 and even abandoning powerful
weapon systems. 76
2. At the International Level
On the global level, as the twenty-first century dawned, CSOs had
become essential to accomplishing international development goals,77
instigators of norm creation and change, 78 agents of socialization, 79 key

example, whether civil rights, environmental, consumer, women’s or conservative, have had
their roots in the nonprofit sector.” Lester Salamon, The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 109 (July 1, 1994), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1994-07-01/risenonprofit-sector [https://perma.cc/DV74-MNEV]. Globally, one can point to the abolitionist
movement, the campaign to end Apartheid, the bans on landmines and wars of aggression within
international law, the movement to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and most recently,
the #MeToo movement as examples of successful CSO-led advocacy campaigns. See Klotz,
supra note 4, at 50; Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society
Targets Land Mines, 52 INT’L ORG. 613, 613-15 (1998).
72. See Emilie Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human
Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 689-91 (2008).
73. Algeria is just one example: here, coalitions of citizens banned together to form
groups that fought their French colonial masters in the late 1950s- early 1960s, which eventually
forced the French to withdraw and led to Algeria’s independence in 1962.
74. See Danielle Meltz, Civil Society in the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (Mar.
29, 2016) (unpublished Undergraduate Honors thesis, University of Colorado) (on file with the
Honors Program at CU Scholar, University of Colorado).
75. See Joel Quirk, The Anti-Slavery Project: From the Slave Trade to Human
Trafficking, in PENNSYLVANIA STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS 54-81 (2011); Price, supra note 62,
at 639; Michael Horowitz & Julia Macdonald, Will Killer Robots Be Banned? Lessons from Past
Civil
Society
Campaigns,
LAWFARE,
(Nov.
5,
2017,
10:00
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/will-killer-robots-be-banned-lessons-past-civil-societycampaigns [https://perma.cc/WA6F-TRG5].
76. Jody Williams, The History of the International Campaigns to Ban Landmines,
NOBEL
PRIZE
(1997),
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1997/icbl/history/
[https://perma.cc/7BZU-R5MH].
77. See Sudarsana Kundu, Women’s Rights Struggle as Restrictions Deepen Globally,
DIPLOMATIC COURIER, (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/womensrights-struggle-restrictions-deepen-globally [https://perma.cc/TKL9-EZBJ].
78. See Ann Towns, Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy
Diffusion “From Below”, 66 INT’L ORG. 179, 189-91 (2012).
79. Brian Greenhill, The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the
Diffusion of Human Rights Norms, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 127, 127 (2010).
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diffusers of global human rights norms, 80 recognized actors within
international law, 81 and catalysts of transformational shifts in global
politics. 82 They were key actors in the global effort to end Apartheid in
South Africa; 83 they led the movements to ban wars of aggression,
landmines, and nuclear weapons within international law; 84 and they
launched global campaigns to raise awareness of violence against
women, with the most recent manifestation of this being the #MeToo
Movement, which many view as an enormous success with respect to
consciousness-raising. 85 In 2017, two influential civil society actors,
the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the
#MeToo Movement, became two more in a long list of CSOs to be
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and Time Magazine’s Person of the
Year, respectively. 86 In short, the associational revolution of the 1990s,
which was inspired by the perception that democracy had defeated
communism as the dominant political ideology, seemed to position
CSOs as rising global superstars that now stood alongside states and
their intergovernmental organizations as influential independent actors
in both national and international politics.

80. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 79-120 (1998).
81. See generally SZAZI, supra note 5.
82. See generally OONA HATHAWAY & SCOTT SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS:
HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017) [hereinafter
HATHAWAY AND SHAPIRO 2017].
83. See Klotz, supra note 4, at 57.
84. See Price, supra note 62, at 619; Alexanrda Zavis & Tracy Wilkinson, Anti-Nuclear
Weapons Group Wins Nobel Peace Prize, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017)
https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-nobel-peace-prize-20171006-story.html
[https://perma.cc/G3U2-8DNV]; see generally THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN
LANDMINES (last visited Dec. 6, 2019), http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/home.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6YSA-26WX].
85. Mala Htun & S. Laurel Weldon, The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change:
Combating Violence against Women in Global Perspective, 1975-2005, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
548, 548-49 (2012); Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/
[https://perma.cc/C4UE-3DJR]. Meaning, there is an enormous success in bringing visibility
and awareness to the issue of sexual assault and violence against women, not unfortunately, in
solving the problem.
86. Bill Chappel, #MeToo is Person of the Year, ‘Time’ says, NPR (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/06/568773208/-metoo-movement-isperson-of-the-year-time-says [https://perma.cc/KKV6-EW5C]; Jon Henley, Nobel Peace Prize
2017: International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Wins Award- As It Turns Out, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/oct/06/nobel-peaceprize-2017-winner-live [https://perma.cc/3G9W-WYTS].

2019]

COUNTER-ASSOCIATIONAL REVOLUTION

419

C. CSOs, Revolutions, Protests, & Mass Uprisings
Empowered by their elevated status, many achievements, and
increasing resources, CSOs began to feel more and more emboldened
to challenge the state’s authority, including at the highest echelons of
power. By mobilizing mass crowds, starting and organizing opposition
movements, and publicly highlighting the weaknesses and ineptitude
of existing regimes, CSOs stood at the forefront of many citizen-led
revolutions that resulted in the toppling of many long-standing
incumbents in the early part of the current century. 87 The color
revolutions that swept the former Soviet states from 2003 to 2005, and
later the Arab Spring uprisings that domino-ed their way through the
Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010, all led to dramatic
shifts in the political status quo, and each, in various ways and to
different extents, were led and organized by, and therefore blamed on
(by the affected governments), CSOs. 88
In the aftermath of both series of revolutions (the Color
Revolutions and the Arab Spring uprisings), there was a significant
uptick in the number of restrictive CSO laws adopted around the globe
and, in many cases, fear of similar revolutions was openly voiced as a
justification for those laws’ passage. 89 According to civil society expert
Thomas Carothers, a “backlash” against international NGOs and
foreign funding for local groups began in earnest following the “color
revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. 90 Carothers,
puzzled by the sudden uptick in restrictive CSO legislation in the
aftermath of these uprisings asked, “[a]re [these governments]
generally afraid that relatively modest Western democracy-training
programs and financial aid for often weak civic and political groups
will undermine their hold on power, or is this fear just a convenient
justification for repressive measures they would take anyway?” 91
According to this possible explanation for the rapid spread of
restrictive CSO laws following 2010, the revolutions of the early part
87. See COLE, supra note 68; Brake & Katzenstein, supra note 67; Murdie & Hicks 2013,
supra note 66, at 546; Joseph Wright & Abel Escribà-Folch, Are Dictators Immune to Human
Rights Shaming? 3 (IBEI, Working Paper No. 25, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1483607
[https://perma.cc/Z68C-8F4J].
88. See generally Rutzen Not-for-Profit, supra note 56.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Thomas Carothers, The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Mar./ Apr. 2006), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-03-01/backlash-againstdemocracy-promotion [https://perma.cc/G49Y-9LVR].
91. Id. at 62.
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of the twenty-first century, which in most cases were in fact organized,
led or supported by CSOs, revealed the full extent of the power and
influence achieved by civil society, particularly those backed by
foreign support. 92 Incumbents, fearful of the ability of foreigners to
manipulate domestic politics via foreign-funded CSOs, and specifically
to inspire, fund and push them to rise up in protest, began cracking
down on the latter’s ability to operate and, notably, receive foreign
support. 93 Advocates of this explanation can point to two powerful
empirical facts: in the six years following the color revolutions,
between 2004 and 2010, more than fifty countries enacted or
considered measures restricting civil society; and in the aftermath of
the Arab Spring uprisings, between 2012 and 2015, more than ninety
such laws were proposed or enacted, as previously discussed. 94
Existing research on protest activity and state-civil society
relations suggests that states are not irrational in fearing the potential
of CSOs to catalyze domestic unrest. 95 Indeed, the presence and density
of NGOs both within a state and in the geographic neighborhood of a
state are linked to increases in the occurrence of domestic non-violent,
anti-government protest movements, while the presence of
international human rights organizations in a country increases the
level of both non-violent and violent protests within that state.96
Interestingly, this body of research also finds that the presence of
human rights organizations in neighboring states can increase the level
of non-violent protest activity within another state. 97
By 2017, one scholar of global protest started referring to our
current era as the “age of rage,” in which protest movements have
become more numerous and geographically widespread. 98 Existing
92. See SUPARNA CHAUDHRY, THE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE:
EXPLAINING STATE REPRESSION OF NGOS 252 (2016) [hereinafter CHAUDHRY 2016].
93. Rutzen Not-for-Profit, supra note 56, at 7.
94. Id. at 7.
95. See KURT SCHOCK, UNARMED INSURRECTIONS: PEOPLE POWER MOVEMENTS IN
NONDEMOCRACIES 83-117 (2005); Amanda Murdie & Tavishi Bhasin, Aiding and Abetting:
Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest, 55 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 163, 163-64 (2010)
[hereinafter Murdie and Bhasin 2010].
96. See Murdie & Bhasin 2006, supra note 93, at 168.
97. See id. at 167; see also Herbert H. Haines, Dangerous Issues and Public Identities:
The Negotiation of Controversy in Two Movement Organizations, 76 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY
2, 231–63 (2006).
98. See Richard Youngs, We live in an ‘age of rage’- and it’s entering a new phase,
CONVERSATION (July 19, 2017, 3:47 AM), https://theconversation.com/we-live-in-a-globalage-of-rage-and-its-entering-a-new-phase-80173 [https://perma.cc/2HQR-FQ2F] [hereinafter
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data points indicate a spike in global protest activity in the 2011-2012
period, followed by a lull, and then a renewed intensification in 2015.
According to political scientist and protest expert Richard Youngs
(2017):
While much debate among [IR] experts has focused on the shift in
power away from the West to rising economies, equally significant
is the nascent era of witnessed bouts of protest. Today’s wave of
protests is relatively unique, however, in effecting all regions of
the world, with similar patterns of revolt spanning diverse national
and cultural contexts. The ubiquity and frequency of large-scale
mobilizations is sufficient to denote a structural shift in how
citizens confront power and in how global civil society organizes
in pursuing its concerns. 99

D. The Law of Coercive Responsiveness
The literature on state repression, while broad and divided on
many fronts, agrees on the existence of one consistently steadfast law,
namely “the law of coercive responsiveness.” 100 This law, whose
consistency is “astonishing in a discipline where very few relationships
withstand close scrutiny,” holds that state authorities always employ
some form of repressive action to counter or eliminate challenges to the
status quo. 101 Since 2016 in the United States, for example, in the wake
of various waves of large scale protest—from the Occupy Movement,
to Black Lives Matter, to the Women’s March, to the Dakota Access
Pipeline protests, and others—at least eighteen sub-national states have
introduced or voted on legislation that places additional restrictions on
the ability of individuals and groups to protest and increasing the
penalties for violations. 102
While the law of coercive responsiveness seems to apply to
regimes of all types, most studies in this body of literature also support
the “fact of democratic peace,” a theory, which holds that state
Youngs 2017]. Richard Youngs is a Professor of International and European Politics at the
University of Warwick, and a leading scholar of protest.
99. See id.
100. Christian Davenport, State Repression and Political Order, 10 ANN. REV. OF POL.
SCI. 1, 1–23 (2007).
101. See Id.
102. ICNL has been tracking US laws, proposed and adopted, that narrow the scope of
permissible protest activities through their “US Protest Law Tracker.” See, e.g., US Protest Law
Tracker,
ICNL
(Oct.
15,
2019),
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker
[https://perma.cc/NPK2-N5NB].
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repression is less likely in democratic states given their different costbenefit analyses and value systems. 103 Interestingly, however, this body
of literature does not consider the use of law as a more subtle,
sophisticated, and modern response to challenges to the status quo.
Regardless, the fascinating literature, which seems ripe for an updated
and expanded definition of state repression, inspires interesting
hypotheses about the linkage between protest activity and the adoption
of restrictive CSO laws, an increasingly common tactic used by states
to, in theory, curb future protest activity.
IV. THE COUNTER-ASSOCIATIONAL REVOLUTION
The rising power of CSOs, especially their ability to cause
consequential political disruptions, did not escape the attention of
states, including states far beyond the borders where such uprisings
occurred. Indeed, this recognition seemed to unleash a powerful stateled counter-trend, the so-called “associational counter-revolution,”
whereby states started to contain and minimize the influence that CSOs
had achieved throughout the associational revolution of the 1990s.104
While a variety of methods were and are used to accomplish this goal,
including violence, harassment, and cooptation, an increasingly
popular tactic of choice by many states is to use the law, a less costly,
even if more time consuming and complicated strategy that could
significantly weaken and defang their civil society sector, or the parts
that are viewed as threatening to the status quo, but with less risk of
international outcry. 105 Beginning roughly in 2005, a cascade of new
103. BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST–
COLD WAR WORLD 3 (1993).
104. See Douglas Rutzen & Cathy Shea, The Associational Counter-Revolution,
ALLIANCE (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.alliancemagazine.org/analysis/the-associationalcounter-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/24DF-RMZE].
105. See State of Civil Society Report 2018, CIVICUS (Mar. 6, 2018)
https://monitor.civicus.org/SOCS2018/ [https://perma.cc/3CLV-48DW]. The violent assault
against CSOs is an enormous problem worldwide. Certain groups, such as Global Witness,
which focuses on environmental civil society actors, as well as Civicus, track incidents of
violence and other crimes inflicted on civil society actors, including targeted murder of CSO
leaders, violent attacks, disappearances of activists, unlawful detentions, public vilification,
forcible closures of CSOs, and other illegal acts. Recent research by Civicus confirms in its
“Anatomy of the Global Crackdown” on civil society that activists being detained, protest
disruption, and excessive force are still the predominate ways in which this crackdown is done.
See their visual of this here: https://monitor.civicus.org/globalfindings0417/. The Author
acknowledges the enormity of this problem, but it is not the focus of this Article, which is
specifically focused on the use of the law to restrict the autonomy of CSOs. The Author hopes,
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restrictive CSO laws began to appear in one state after another, a
phenomenon so alarming in scope and spread that it was named by civil
society activists and human rights attorneys for the effects it was having
on CSOs: the closing space trend, referring to the elimination of safe
and available spaces for civil society actors to freely operate. 106
A.

Identification of A Global Problem

First identified as a systematic and global problem in 2006,107 the
spreading closing space trend reached “crisis” proportions by 2014,108
and “emergency” status by 2017, 109 according to civil society experts
and observers. Human rights defenders and civil society activists have
described this global phenomenon in apocalyptic, even hysteric, terms:
as an “alarming” 110 “existential threat” to civil society; 111 a global
“contagion” with unstoppable and incurable force, 112 an all-out “global
war” on CSOs; 113 and an attempt to “choke out” global civil society
in future research, to broaden their inquiry to include these other tactics used by states to repress
the work of CSOs.
106. See Maria Stephan, Responding to the Global Threat of Closing Civic Space: Policy
Options,
UNITED
STATES
INSTITUTE
OF
PEACE
(Mar.
21,
2017),
https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/03/responding-global-threat-closing-civic-spacepolicy-options [https://perma.cc/W3KD-RCLP]; see also Alex Tiersky & Emily Renard,
Closing Space: Restrictions on Civil Society Around the World and U.S. Responses,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44458.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CH47-BGBK].
107. See Carl Gershman & Michael Allen, New Threats to Freedom: The Assault on
Democracy
Assistance,
17
J. DEMOCRACY no.
2, 36, 36-37
(2006),
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Gershman-17-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7V9R-F4CH]; see also Carothers, supra note 88.
108. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER 2014, supra note 6 at 25.
109. See Worldmap, CIVICUS, https://monitor.civicus.org/ [https://perma.cc/7JLAMAPF] [hereinafter Worldmap 2019].
110. M. Kiai, 2013. “Civil Society’s Right to Seek, Receive and Use Resources- Human,
Material and Financial.” UN Special Rapporteur on Peaceful Assembly and Association
A/HRC/23/39. Human Rights Council Report, at 9.
111. See Maina Kai (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
and of Association), Lex Rieffel, Institutions are Under Existential Threat, Globally,
BROOKINGS, June 28, 2018, available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2018/06/28/global-institutions-are-under-existential-threat/
[https://perma.cc/7B3WQZRG].
112. Sarah Mendelson, Why Governments Target Civil Society and What Can Be Done
in Response: A New Agenda, CSIS (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/whygovernments-target-civil-society-and-what-can-be-done-response
[https://perma.cc/9E5RSNWQ].
113. See Washington Post Editorial Team, The Global War against NGOs,
WASHINGTON POST (December 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-war-
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altogether. 114 Hyperbole aside, a concerted attempt by an increasing
number of states, including democratic states, to stem or reverse civil
society’s fortunes achieved in the 1990s—and specifically through the
passage of laws—was indeed well underway, and gaining momentum
by the end of the first decade of the new millennium. 115
1. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
The small handful of watchdog organizations that closely track
legal developments pertaining to CSOs have confirmed this trend,
though their findings tend to be a bit scattered and piecemeal. The
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), a global leader in
civil society laws around the world, documented more than fifty
countries that either enacted or considered legal measures restricting
civil society between 2004 and 2010. 116 Between 2012 and 2015, ICNL
reported that an additional ninety restrictive CSO laws were proposed
or enacted; and by May 2018, they were reporting on the existence of
some 144 laws and regulations that had either been proposed or enacted
by seventy-two countries. 117 An article published by ICNL’s founder
and president, Douglas Rutzen, in 2015 stated that the number of
restrictive legal initiatives proposed or adopted started to double each
year beginning in 2012; 118 and an internal ICNL document, which
tracks a broader array of legal instruments, reveals even higher
numbers of restrictive legal initiatives: over 400 state-led legal or
against-ngos/2015/12/10/2ce59002-992b-11e5-b499-76cbec161973_story.html
[https://perma.cc/DT2F-TWD4].
114. Kenneth Roth, The Great Civil Society Choke Out, FOREIGN POLICY, (Jan. 27,
2016) https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/27/the-great-civil-society-choke-out-human-rightsdemocracy-india-russia-china-kenya/ [https://perma.cc/KC9A-KLJE].
115. See Rutzen 2015, supra note 6 at 2; see also CHAUDHRY 2016, supra note 90 at 85.
116. See Rutzen 2015, supra note 6, at 3. The Author also worked as a contracting human
rights attorney for the ICNL since 2007.
117. See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR NOT PROFIT LAW, EFFECTIVE DONOR
RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE OF CLOSING CIVIC SPACE 9 (2018),
http://www.icnl.org/news/2018/Effective%20donor%20responses%20FINAL%201%20May%
202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZJL-HGME]. The distinction between a “proposed” and
“enacted” law is a crucial one, as this Article addresses in the “key definitions” Section below
(located in the broader Research Design section). This Article’s research will focus on adopted
laws, though the Author is attempting to gather information on proposed laws (and proposal
dates) as well. If the Author is able to collect enough data on these proposals, the Author hopes
to expand the inquiry to include both. Also discussed below in the “key definitions” Section is
what precisely the Author mean by “laws,” which is expanded to include anything that carries
the force of law, such as certain policy pronouncements and executive decrees.
118. See Rutzen 2015, supra note 6 at 4.
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policy instruments (including laws, decrees, regulations, key policies,
and the like) imposing new restrictions on CSOs proposed or adopted
since 2012 were contained in this document. 119 ICNL’s vice president
for legal affairs, David Moore, an internationally renown expert of civil
society laws, describes the recent spate of restrictive CSO laws around
the world as “a paradigm shift” for global civil society, which has seen
its freedom to operate over the past twenty years significantly
diminish. 120
2. Civicus
Civicus, another organization that closely tracks developments
affecting global civil society, maintains a constantly-updated virtual
map visually depicting the ever-expanding closing space phenomenon.
A cursory glance of this map reveals that those countries with “narrow”
or “open” environments for CSOs, the least restrictive labels a country
can receive, constitute a slim minority, while those countries with
“closed,” “repressed,” or “obstructed” environments comprise the vast
majority. 121 According to Civicus, only four percent of the human
population currently lives in a country where civil society is able to
freely operate, and in 111 countries, well over half of all nations, CSOs
are under “serious attack.” 122 Though Civicus tracks all types of
challenges faced by CSOs—legal, illegal, and extralegal—their
research similarly confirms the “viral-like spread of new laws” snaking
their way around the globe that attempt to minimize the autonomy and
increase government oversight of CSOs. 123 According to their 2017
119. These mostly include adopted laws (including amendments to existing laws), but
also include proposed laws, official policy statements, official regulations, and executive
decrees, a broader category of legal initiatives than those captured in the other lower figures.
120. Michael Schuman, An Increasingly Uncivil World, US NEWS (July 31, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-07-31/growing-number-ofcountries-are-clamping-down-on-civil-society-groups
[https://perma.cc/JS4X-VKMN]
[hereinafter Schuman 2017].
121. See Worldmap 2019, supra note 107. See also CIVICUS, “How it Works,” section
on “Ratings,” available at https://monitor.civicus.org/Ratings/ [https://perma.cc/EGN7-6746]
(explaining the various labels given to each country).
122.
Rebecca Ratcliffe, Civil Rights ‘Under Serious Attack’ Across the Globe,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
27,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2018/nov/27/civil-rights-under-serious-attack-across-the-globe
[https://perma.cc/AN4C-WQL8].
123. See Harriet Sherwood, Human Rights Groups Face Global Crackdown ‘Not Seen in
a
Generation,’
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
26,
2015)
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/aug/26/ngos-face-restrictions-laws-human-rights-
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report, “when it comes to the freedom of association [the cornerstone
freedom underlying the existence of CSOs] far more disenabling laws
and policies than enabling ones are being introduced.” 124
The few scholars who have examined the closing space
phenomenon not only confirm the rise in restrictive CSO laws around
the globe, but also their negative, and in some cases devastating,
consequences. 125 A variety of reports suggest that the percentage of
states that have adopted restrictive CSO laws, notably including laws
that restrict CSOs’ ability to access foreign funding, has risen sharply
since 2013, 126 and a mounting body of evidence suggests the dire
consequences they are having on CSOs, which in some contexts is
leading to the collapse of entire sectors of civil society. 127 A 2013
study, which examined the spread of restrictive foreign funding laws,
found that at least twenty-six percent of the UN’s current 193 member
states either prohibit or restrict CSOs’ access to foreign funding. 128
Another 2017 study, building on this earlier study, found that the
adoption of restrictive CSO foreign funding laws not only negatively
impacts CSOs but the adopting states too; indeed, adopting this type of
law was associated with a thirty-two percent decline in bilateral aid
inflows to the state in subsequent years. 129

generation [https://perma.cc/4CTH-DLT4]; see also CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER 2014,
supra note 6, at 1.
124. Civicus, State Of Civil Society Report 2017, at 7. “Disenabling” is a term often used
by civil society activists to describe laws, and other instruments, that create an environment not
conducive to a robust, independent civil society sector. For CSOs to flourish and reach their full
potential, according to civil society activists, states should create an “enabling environment”
conducive to their success, which would include a legal and regulatory framework that
encourages and permits their independence and growth.
125. See DUPUY et al., WHO SURVIVED, supra note 6 at 13-16.
126. See Samantha Laufer, A Difference in Approach: Comparing the US Foreign Agents
Registration Act with Other Laws Targeting Internationally Funded Civil Society, 19 INT’L J.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5, 27 (2017).
127. See Kristen Chick, Egypt’s Civil Society Is on Life Support, FOREIGN POL’Y, (Dec.
13,
2017),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/13/egypts-civil-society-is-on-life-support/
[https://perma.cc/7TTK-88QJ]; Charles Digges, ‘Foreign Agent’ Law Has Put 33 Percent of
Russia’s NGOs out of Business, BELLONA, (Oct. 20 2015), https://bellona.org/news/russianhuman-rights-issues/russian-ngo-law/2015-10-foreign-agent-law-has-put-33-percent-ofrussias-ngos-out-of-business [https://perma.cc/62NV-ZBF3] [hereinafter Digges 2015].
128. Darin Christensen & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid
to NGOs, 24 J. OF DEMOCRACY 77, 80 (2013).
129. DUPUY et al., PANEL STUDY, supra note 6, at 99.
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B. Existing Explanations Fail to Explain Adoptions by Democratic
States
The variety of explanations often given or implied in discussions
of the closing space phenomenon make intuitive sense when applied to
non-democratic states. Of course, non-democratic states would feel
threatened by foreign-funded democracy-promoting, and/or watchdog
type, non-governmental organizations that threaten to upset the status
quo. This intuition is, in fact, backed up by existing empirical data
reflected in the literature on human rights organizations, which
confirms that repressive, authoritarian states, which lack transparency
and accountability, fear the ability of CSOs to expose their human
rights violations, corruption, and malfeasance, and therefore, seek to
restrict their influence. The literature on human rights organizations
confirms that repressive states often catch the attention of these
watchdog organizations, which are often eager to publicize the state’s
wrongdoing, particularly when it involves egregious violations
involving physical integrity rights, such as torture and execution.130
Rather than end these violations, human rights-violating states instead
often seek to silence those who monitor and report such violations,
particularly human rights and other watchdog organizations who are
often well-placed and well-networked to make their voices heard not
only domestically but internationally as well. 131
Yet, the human rights literature often assumes that “those
governments that do not use repression, or have little or nothing to hide,
have no incentive to restrict monitoring by civil society.” 132 As such,
the focus tends to remain, perhaps understandably, on the most
abhorrent human rights violations and the most repressive states. As a
result of this fixation, this body of literature (among others), and even
certain HROs themselves, have failed to notice the large and evergrowing number of human rights abiding states, or non-repressive
states, that are similarly starting to reign in the influence and
independence of their CSO sectors, albeit in subtler and less egregious
ways. A recent study concluded that the “unintended consequence” of
state ratification of international human rights treaties is that civil
130. See Matthew Krain, J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the
Severity of Genocides or Politicides?: Naming and Shaming Perpetrator, 56 INT.’L STUDIES
QUARTERLY 574, 578 (2012).
131. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, supra note 78, at 1-37.
132. Kristen Bakke, Neil Mitchell & Hannah Smidt, When States Crack Down on Human
Rights Defenders, at 7 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
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society is placed at “higher risk of facing restrictions from repressive
governments with abuses to hide.” 133 In assuming that only “repressive
governments” restrict civil society, they failed to assess whether a
similar conclusion could potentially be reached about non-repressive,
democratic governments as well.
While often anecdotally noted in the course of discussing the
broader closing space trend, to my knowledge there are no systematic
scholarly attempts to explain why the legal backlash against CSOs is
specifically occurring in democratic states, and in increasing numbers.
This, at least to the Author, is the most puzzling aspect of the broader
closing space trend. While other aspects of the Author’s research
agenda examine the explanatory portion of this perplexing,
consequential, and to date, still largely unexplained global
phenomenon, this Article is largely descriptive and focuses primarily
on mapping the global landscape of restrictive CSO laws in strong
democratic states, to which the Author now turns.
V. KEY DEFINITIONS & DISTINCTIONS
In order to map the rise and spread of restrictive CSO laws in
historically strong democratic states, the Author carefully reviewed and
documented the CSO legal frameworks for the world’s strongest
democratic countries, as defined below. The review spanned a nearly
thirty year time frame, from 1990 to 2018, which includes what is often
considered the golden era for CSOs in the 1990s, 134 followed by what
is referred to as “the associational counter-revolution,” as previously
discussed. 135 Before fully exploring the Author’s research findings, a
few key definitions are first in order.
A. Strong Democratic State
First, Strong Democratic State. The Author’s research captures
only the most well established and consolidated democracies in the
world, which as you will see from the complete list, includes some
133. Id. at 9.
134. Catherine Agg, Trends in Government Support for Non-Governmental
Organizations: Is the Golden Age of NGOs Behind Us?, UNRISD Program Paper Number 23,
1,1
(June
2006),
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/(httpPublications)/E8BC05C1E4B8AD6F
C12571D1002C4F0B?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/X375-F4RS].
135. Rutzen & Shea 2015, supra note 102.
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states that are arguably starting to fall outside the parameters of this
definition, such as Hungary and Poland, whose democratic credentials
have come into question in recent years. 136 To identify the strongest
democracies in the world, the Author relied on the Regime Trends
Dataset, which is part of the Polity V project conducted by the Center
for Systemic Peace. 137 This is a highly regarded and often relied upon
database, especially among political scientists. Based on Polity’s
twenty-one point scale, which ranges from -10 to +10, a democratic
state is one that receives a score of six or higher; a perfect ten
corresponds to a full democracy. 138 The Polity scheme consists of six
component measures designed to capture the key qualities that
comprise a democratic system of governance, which include method of
executive recruitment (how the executive comes to power), constraints
on executive authority, and political competition. 139 Usefully, neither
the autonomy of the civil society sector nor respect for the freedom of
association are specifically included in Polity’s definition of
democracy; one or both typically feature in other democracy measures,
such as the one established by Freedom House. 140 This is fortunate, and
one of the primary reasons the Author relied on Polity, as their
exclusion of respect for the freedom of association in their definition
of democracy eliminates the potential for spurious findings. Polity’s
user manual explicitly states, “we do not include coded data on civil
liberties.” 141
136. Note, however, that the Polity V project, which the Author depended up for
democracy scores, continues to rate Hungary and Poland as “full” democracies, which means
they have received the highest score, a 10. Hungary has received a 10 since 1990, and Poland
since 1992. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019 (2019)
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6B8-52RD]; see also
MONTY MARSHALL, CTR FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, POLITY IV PROJECT: USER MANUAL POLITY
IV
PROJECT,
11
(2017)
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWebcompressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UKQ-3ASZ] [hereinafter Marshall 2017].
137. See Monty Marshall, Individual Country Regime Trends, POLITY IV PROJECT 19462013 (June 6, 2014), http://systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm [https://perma.cc/C2BPRHW6].
138. This Article excludes laws passed by democratic states during times of martial law
or in the aftermath of coups, such as occurred in Turkey and Thailand in recent years (despite
maintaining their democracy status according to Polity).
139. Marshall 2017, supra note 134, at 15.
140. Freedom in the World Report 2018, Methodology, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018 [https://perma.cc/9VUF524P] (last visited June 6, 2019).
141. Marshall 2017, supra note 134, at 14.
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The Polity IV Regime Trends dataset includes all “major,
independent states in the global system,” defined as states having a
population greater than 500,000; this includes 167 nations. For each of
these 167 states, an annual polity score is given for the years spanning
1800-2017, allowing me to clearly identify whether a particular country
was a strong democracy in the years leading up to (and following) the
adoption of a particular CSO law. 142 The Author confined their review
to the years spanning 1990-2018, which includes the decade known as
CSOs’ golden age, the 1990s, followed by the eighteen years
comprising the new millennium, when the golden age ended and began
reversing course. 143 To narrow my scope to the world’s leading
democracies, the Author identified all countries that obtained a score
of at least 9 (so either a 9 or a 10, the two highest scores) for at least
five consecutive years between 1990 and 2018. This list, which came
to fifty-nine countries, comprises my population of designated strong
democratic states. 144
For each of these fifty-nine strong democratic states, the Author
carefully researched and documented their CSO legal frameworks,
collecting all relevant CSO laws (proposed, adopted, and
withdrawn/rejected) that could be located, including laws that appeared
permissive, restrictive, and neutral on their face. Following this review,
the Author coded each law as either permissive or restrictive, as further
defined below. Neutral laws were coded as permissive, as neutrality
raises no issues from an international legal perspective.
B. Restrictive CSO Law
The next term in need of definition is restrictive CSO law. To be
labeled as restrictive, a law had to impose an additional new restriction
on the CSO sector (or one sector of CSOs), or it had to in some way
reduce its previous levels of operational, financial and/or legal
autonomy in some meaningful way. Examples of restrictive laws
include laws that impose new constraints on CSOs’ ability to access
domestic or foreign funding; laws that require CSOs to obtain specific
government permission before engaging in certain activities; laws that
142. The Author has emailed with the research center that created the Polity IV project,
the Center for Systemic Peace, and inquired about updated regime scores for the years after
2013. The Author is still awaiting their response. Their website indicates that they are working
on an updated version, Polity V, but does not specify when it will be released.
143. See Salamon, supra note 69; Rutzen 2015, supra note 6 at 2.
144. See Appendix 1 for the full list.
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complicate the ability of CSOs to form by imposing additional new
barriers to registering; laws that impose onerous new reporting
obligations; and laws that restrict the ability of CSOs to engage in
public demonstrations. Unfortunately, the Author cannot claim to have
gathered every law conceivably relevant to CSOs, which no doubt
includes a much broader universe of laws than the ones located.
Instead, the Author attempted to locate and isolate those laws that most
directly address and impact CSOs and the things that stand at the core
of their existence: their ability to form, operate, receive funding, and
assemble. The Author did not include laws that only indirectly
implicate, but do not directly address, CSOs, such as freedom of
information, media, or criminal laws, which can impact the work of
many CSOs, oftentimes in significant ways, but typically does not
address them specifically and directly.
The Author examined four types of laws in particular: (1) lifecycle
or framework CSO laws; (2) assembly laws; (3) foreign and domestic
funding laws; and (4) counterterrorism laws. Lifecycle laws, which are
the primary laws governing the existence and operations of CSOs,
include laws outlining the general formation, operation, domestic
funding, and dissolution of CSOs; they also typically include reporting
and auditing obligations, penalties for noncompliance, and detail the
acceptable scope of activities that CSOs can engage in. Assembly laws
include laws impacting the ability of CSOs to hold public
demonstrations and events, including protests and rallies. Funding laws
govern how and under what conditions a CSO can receive funding,
whether foreign or domestic, and how they can access other sources of
support, such as through fundraising, philanthropy, and donations.
Finally, counterterrorism laws, as the name implies, govern how CSOs
must comport with new measures designed to prevent terrorism, money
laundering, and terrorism financing. The latter category was the
trickiest one of all, as it threatened to overwhelm my research and overprove my point. Nearly every state in the world passed new
counterterrorism legislation in the post-9/11 era; indeed, doing so was
mandated by at least two different UN Security Council resolutions.145

145. These include Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which urged countries to
implement a number of measures intended to enhance their legal and institutional ability to
counter terrorist activities at home, in their regions and around the world and Security Council
Resolution 1624 (2005), calling on states to prevent incitement to commit terrorism. See S.C.
Res. 1373, ¶ 4 (Sept. 28, 2001); see also S.C. Res. 1624, ¶ 1 (Sept. 14, 2005). For more
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Many of these new laws impose new restrictions on CSOs, a topic unto
itself to be sure. 146 For my purposes, and the purposes of this Article
however, the Author wanted to look at a broader phenomenon and, as
such, was very careful when including counter-terrorism laws in my
review. Only those that imposed meaningful new restrictions (or
subtracted significantly from previous levels of autonomy), and that
went beyond those restrictions considered legitimate under human
rights laws were included in my review. Many new restrictions
imposed by the new counterterrorism laws do not qualify as illegitimate
under a human rights legal perspective.
By broadly defining restrictive CSO legislation, the Author
overcomes a key criticism of the existing literature on the closing space
phenomenon, namely that it heavily focuses on foreign funding laws to
the exclusion of all others. Focusing on only one specific type of law
offers only a small and potentially misleading snapshot of the broader
reality and the broader legal environment for CSOs, which are shaped
and affected by many different types of law. 147 Despite that most of the
scholarship on the closing space trend seems to focus on the passage of
restrictive foreign funding laws, a recent study published in 2018 found
that foreign funding laws constitute only twenty-eight percent of the
laws being passed that impose new restrictions on CSOs. 148 In contrast,
the more foundational lifecycle laws constitute forty-seven percent of
such laws, and another twenty-five percent impact the ability of CSOs
to exercise their right to freedom of assembly, so-called “assembly
laws.” 149 As shown below, the Author’s findings discovered a similar
breakdown in the types of laws being passed that impact CSOs, with
foreign funding laws constituting only one, and a minority at that, of
the types of laws being adopted that constrain the autonomy of CSOs.
The Author not only includes formal laws in my review, but
policy pronouncements, executive orders, and other official decrees
that carry the force of law as well. As such, this Article’s definition of
law is wider in scope than formal legislation adopted by a legislative
branch according to the typical legislative rules. For example, a
information, see About the Counter-Terrorism Committee, UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNS.,
https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/7P3V-D2BL] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019).
146. See generally BEN HAYES, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM
ON CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (Maike Lukow & Christine Meissler eds. 2017).
147. See Rutzen 2015, supra note 6, at 4-6.
148. See International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2018, supra note 115, at 10.
149. Id.
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restrictive policy framework adopted in 2012 in Slovakia, a full
democracy according to Polity, directly led to the de-registration of
over 4000 noncompliant NGOs. This policy framework, which directly
addresses CSOs, has the effect of law, and thus, is treated as equivalent
to a restrictive CSO law in my analysis. For a policy to be included,
however, the impact on CSOs had to be obvious and direct, as in the
previous example; in other words, it had to directly address CSOs and
directly affect their behavior or organizational existence without the
need for further implementing legislation. An official announcement of
a policy that, for example, asserts a need for greater oversight over the
civil society sector, but does not require or trigger any specific actions
in furtherance of that announcement, would not go far enough to be
included as equivalent to a law in the Author’s review.
In most cases, whether a pronouncement carries the force of law
or not is obvious, such as in Spain, which issues legally binding royal
decrees, and in the United States, which issues legally binding
executive orders, both of which are well known. In other countries,
however, this proved a bit more difficult to ascertain. In situations
where the Author had any insecurity about whether to include the
instrument/pronouncement in her review, she aired on the side of not
including it. The Author also excluded local and state-level laws from
the scope of analysis and focused only on laws adopted at the
federal/national level. State and local laws, which impact fewer CSOs,
potentially open the door to a different and more parochial set of
motivating factors not always relevant to, or just different from, those
experienced by national governments, which face heightened
international audience costs and different domestic pressures than those
experienced by non-federal officials who are accountable to smaller
constituencies. To be sure, this forced the Author to exclude certain
highly relevant laws from my scope of analysis, such as the spate of
recent laws proposed and adopted in US states that impose new
restrictions on protest activities, 150 and the similar string of restrictive
protest measures adopted in certain Australian states. 151 Yet, scoping
150. See Int’l Ctr. For Not for Profit Law, Protest Law Tracker 2019 (Oct. 24, 2019),
http://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/ [https://perma.cc/TM7Z-LAZ6].
151. See Matt Ford, The New Legislation Targeting Protesters, ATLANTIC, (Feb. 28,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/anti-protest-bills/518004/
[https://perma.cc/5KS9-XKN6]; see also Kristen Alexander, Australian State Bans Right to
Protest, DAILY BEAST, (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.thedailybeast.com/australian-state-bansright-to-protest [https://perma.cc/MH5Z-TFKW].
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the project was necessary for both practical and conceptual reasons:
searching for all sub-federal laws is an infeasible project for one
researcher working alone, and conceptually, as stated above, the
Author’s sense is that different factors contribute to the passage of subfederal and federal laws. There is one upshot to this (and other
exclusions), however. Because the Author was very conservative when
choosing which laws went into the database for analysis, it can safely
be said that, if anything, they understate the conclusion they reach
below, namely, that strong democratic states, like their authoritarian
counterparts, are also adopting restrictive CSO legislation and in
surprisingly large numbers.
C. Civil Society Organization
The Author’s third, and final, definition is for Civil Society
Organization (“CSO”). By CSO, the Article refers broadly to nongovernmental organizations, both domestic and transnational, which
are entities formed voluntarily by individuals to pursue shared concerns
or interests, which do not include profit-making and are not
accomplished through violence. This inclusive definition includes a
wide variety of organizations, beyond just the more typically
referenced NGOs, which are in fact only one type of CSO (which is
why the Author prefers CSO over NGO). My definition does, however,
exclude government created NGOs (“GONGOs”), as well as terrorist
organizations and other criminal syndicates. The Author also excludes
the media, which many consider part of civil society, as well as political
parties; in both cases, the Author believes that different, and frankly
more restrictive, rules should apply than those applied to the broader
body of civil society organizations. For example, political parties
should be prohibited from accessing foreign donations and their
funding should be 100 percent transparent; but these rules should not
apply to CSOs (as defined here), at least not as strictly, as doing so
would violate human rights law and specifically, the ability of
individuals to freely associate.
While a multitude of definitions have been proposed for CSOs,
this Article’s definition focuses on the three most common features that
tend to unite them. 152 A CSO, in the Author’s view, must be nongovernmental (not formed or operated by or on behalf of a government
152. US DEP’T STATE, supra note 1; see FERGUSON, supra note 1, at 15–16; see also
WOLFF & POPPE 2015, supra note 1, at 5; see also KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 78, at 92.
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entity), non-profit (the primary purpose for forming and existing is not
profit-making), and voluntary (founded by individuals who, on their
own accord and through no compulsion or government-imposed
mandate, effectuated its creation in order to pursue shared interests or
concerns). Some definitions include an additional element having to do
with pursuing a “public good,” 153 but the Author has disposed of this
element, in favor of a more expansive and inclusive definition of CSO
that includes organizations formed for any lawful purpose with the
exception of only those purposes enumerated above (governmental,
profit-driven, violence).
As such, the Author’s definition of CSO encompasses NGOs,
voluntary organizations, professional associations, sports clubs,
religious groups, unions, foundations, charities, and philanthropic
organizations, among others. 154 The scope of this inquiry includes
CSOs that are registered and work exclusively in one country (domestic
CSOs) and those that work across borders (international or
transnational CSOs), 155 and the Author remains agnostic as to their
substantive focus. The CSOs that are included in this analysis can have
any focus or purpose, and exist for any reason whatsoever, so long as
their reason for existing is not profit-making and their goals are not
carried out through criminal or violent means.
As previously discussed, the Author began her search in 1990, a
year that marks the start of a new era in international politics,
particularly for CSOs, as it corresponds with the dawning of the
associational revolution when CSOs proliferated globally, established
themselves as legitimate non-state actors, and began to wield
153. See Dan Cardinali, The Adaptive Challenge of Restoring Trust in Civil Society,
STANFORD
SOCIAL
INNOVATION
REVIEW
(June
2018),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_adaptive_challenge_of_restoring_trust_in_civil_society
[https://perma.cc/6XS2-TFHS].
154. Different countries use different words for their CSOs (for example the United
States defines “nonprofit organizations” as including charitable or religious organizations, social
welfare organizations, labor and agricultural organizations, business leagues, and veterans’
organizations). The Author has chosen to use CSO because, in the Author’s opinion, it is the
most general word that exists to define the civil society sector as a whole; it is an umbrella term.
Others have used NGO instead, but to follow this more standard practice would complicate this
analysis as many countries distinguish between NGOs, charitable organizations, foundations,
and other organizations within the law; an NGO will be its own distinct category with, at times,
its own distinct law. By using the term CSO, this Article can allow these distinctions to exist.
155. By transnational CSO, this Article refers to a CSO that is based in one country but
regularly carries out its activities in another country or countries (for example, Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch); a domestic CSO was founded in, and is based and
exclusively operates in, a single country (such as most community groups).
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significant influence over the course of international and domestic
affairs. 156 By starting the review in 1990, which also roughly
corresponds with the end of the third wave of democracy, the Author
was able to gather nearly thirty years of data, which allowed for
variation and temporal patterns to appear, including key moments of
particularly intense legislative activity. This time frame also allowed
the Author to examine if certain key events in international politics
potentially influenced passage of restrictive CSO laws, as has been
suggested in other reports on the closing space trend, such as the 9/11
attacks, the color revolutions that swept Eastern Europe in the early
2000s, the Arab Spring that erupted throughout the Middle East in the
years after 2010, or the passage of certain high-profile restrictive CSO
laws elsewhere, such as India’s 2010 restrictive foreign funding or
Russia’s 2012 foreign agents law. 157
VI. FINDINGS: THE SPREAD OF RESTRICTIVE CSO LAWS IN
STRONG DEMOCRATIC STATES
The Author collected and reviewed the CSO legal frameworks for
the world’s strongest democracies, a list of states that, until now has
been almost entirely overlooked by those who have examined the
broader closing space trend. This is perhaps understandable. After all,
each of the strong democratic countries included in this analysis has
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), which codifies the freedom of association and is
considered binding international law, nearly all are also signatories to
a regional human rights treaty that similarly protects this right, and with
rare exception, such as in Australia, each nation the Author reviewed
recognizes this fundamental right in their national constitution. 158 Yet,
the findings confirm that this trend is not isolated to repressive,
authoritarian leaning countries, or to countries known for egregious
human rights violations, or to countries with weak economies, as was
156. See Salamon, supra note 69.
157. It is possible that the Author will determine, in the course of this review, that going
further back in history would provide additional context and insight; but for now, the Author
plans to begin at 1990 and to end with 2017.
158. The United States is another exception. The right to association, though not
explicitly in the US Constitution (unlike most other states in the world), was recognized as
implicit in the US Constitution by the US Supreme Court in the case of Roberts v. United States
Jaycees 468 US 609 (1984). See the official UN ratification table for the ICCPR here:
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/FC9Q-PBED].
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previously assumed. 159 Moreover, the Author’s findings confirm that
this trend does not implicate only one type of law, namely foreign
funding laws, or one category of CSO (human rights and other
advocacy organizations), but instead, that it involves a broader array of
laws and CSOs. Most fundamentally, my findings confirm that the
closing space trend is a truly global phenomenon, one that transcends
geography, GDP, regime type, development status, and most
importantly, one that is not confined only to repressive, non-democratic
regimes with histories of overt persecution and vocal condemnation of
civil society actors.
Quite to the contrary, the Author’s findings reveal that the world’s
strongest democracies, in surprisingly high numbers, are—like their
authoritarian counterparts—adopting restrictive CSO legislation.160
Indeed, thirty-four out of the fifty-nine democratic countries, well over
half (fifty-eight percent), have adopted at least one restrictive CSO law
since 1990. When proposed laws are added to this list, the total comes
to thirty-eight states, or over sixty-three percent, of all “strong
democratic states” (see Figure 1).

159. See, e.g., Bakke, Mitchell, & Smidt, supra note 130, at 2-3.
160. See Chrystie Flournoy Swiney, Undemocratic Civil Society Laws Are Appearing in
Democracies,
OPENGLOBALRIGHTS
(Mar.
28,
2019),
https://www.openglobalrights.org/undemocratic-civil-society-laws-are-appearing-indemocracies-too/ [https://perma.cc/H6DZ-6CND]. Cf. Swiney, Laws Are Chipping Away at
Democracy
Around
the
World,
CONVERSATION
(Apr.
2,
2019),
https://theconversation.com/laws-are-chipping-away-at-democracy-around-the-world-113089
[https://perma.cc/9PSS-6C7H].
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In total, the Author uncovered eighty-seven enacted laws, ten laws still
under consideration, and thirteen restrictive CSO laws that have been
either withdrawn or rejected (see Figure 2).

Among those states that have adopted a restrictive CSO law,
nearly sixty-seven percent (twenty-two of thirty-three) have adopted
two or more restrictive CSOs laws, and over a third of them (thirty-six
percent, or twelve of thirty-three) have adopted three or more (see
Figure 3).

One state, Israel, has adopted a stunning nine such laws; while
both Australia and Poland have adopted six, and France, five. Bolivia,

2019]

COUNTER-ASSOCIATIONAL REVOLUTION

439

Croatia, and India have enacted four; and Hungary, New Zealand,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States closely follow: each
has adopted three (see Figure 4).

Such patterns suggest that restrictive CSO laws come in clusters, or
perhaps that the passage of one incentivizes passage of additional
restrictions. In Hungary and India, for example, and in certain nondemocracies, such as Russia, this has certainly been the case, with one
law leading to additional laws, which oftentimes have the effect of
stiffening the penalties associated with, or further constraining, the
earlier law.
Of the adopted eighty-seven restrictive CSO laws the Author
located, forty-six of them, the majority, involve lifecycle or framework
CSO laws, which as defined above are the primary laws governing the
existence, operations, domestic funding, and dissolution of CSOs. An
additional eighteen laws pertain to CSOs’ ability to access foreign
funding, hire foreign employees, or form foreign affiliations. Finally,
fifteen of the restrictive CSO laws are counterterrorism laws, and
additional ten of them involve assembly laws (see Figure 5).
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In terms of timing, the trend line is very clear and consistent: the
proposal and passage of restrictive CSO laws in strong democratic
states is a recent phenomenon; it is not just a twenty-first-century trend,
but an even more recent (roughly) post-2010 trend (see Figure 6).

The vast majority of the restrictive CSO laws adopted, sixty-two
of the eighty-seven adopted laws, were passed from 2013 to 2018; and
all eleven of the current proposals were proposed in 2017 or later, with
the exception of one proposed in 2016. The years 2016 and 2017 saw
the highest number of adoptions and proposals: fifteen separate laws
were adopted in each year, and eight were proposed (and remain
proposals) in the two years combined. Tracing the temporal arc of
passage and proposals, one can also confirm that this trend is
accelerating and gaining momentum within strong democratic states,
as other reports on the closing space trend reveal with respect to non-
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democratic states. 161 The 1990s saw very few new legislative
restrictions placed on CSOs. In fact, in the entire decade, the Author
was able to locate only three laws that imposed new restrictions on
CSOs or subtracted from their previous level of autonomy, strongly
suggesting that the 1990s were indeed a golden age for CSOs, at least
with respect to their autonomy from state control in strong democratic
states.
The trend line revealed by the above figure confirms the relative
newness and recent momentum behind the spread of restrictive CSO
laws into democratic countries. The sudden decline in 2018 perhaps
suggests that this trend has peaked or reached a saturation point. Once
laws are in place, after all, there is normally no need for passage of new
or additional laws that accomplish the same goal. As such, the decline
in adoption rates in 2018 does not necessarily suggest anything about
the reversal of this trend, but instead, that this trend is well entrenched
in most democratic countries and that the passage of additional new
laws is no longer viewed as necessary.
In terms of geographic spread, all regions and continents of the
world have been impacted by the spread of restrictive CSO laws in
recent years, as previous reports confirm. And democracies are no
exception. Among the world’s strongest democratic countries,
European countries adopted the highest number of restrictive CSO
laws: twenty-two of the thirty-three democracies in Europe that made
my list, or two-thirds, have adopted a restrictive CSO law since 1990.
All combined, these European laws total forty-six. The fewest
restrictive civil society laws were passed in African democracies;
indeed, only two of the six, or one-third, of the African democracies to

161.

See generally CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER 2014, supra note 6.
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qualify as a strong democratic state have adopted a restrictive CSO
law. Falling in the middle between these two were Asian countries—
four (of seven) Asian democracies have adopted fifteen restrictive CSO
laws—and Latin American democracies—five of the nine Latin
American states that made the cut have adopted nine such laws. The
two countries from North America that made the list, the United States
and Canada, have both adopted restrictive CSO laws (eight laws in
total). And finally, the only country from the Middle East to qualify as
a strong democratic state, Israel, adopted nine restrictive laws in the
time period under review, the highest passage rate of any of the
countries under review (see Figures 7 and 8).

Twenty-eight of the nearly sixty states that the Author reviewed
are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”), an intergovernmental organization focused
on stimulating economic progress and world trade founded in 1961
composed of thirty-five member states. Many consider the members of
the OECD, which is focused on stimulating economic progress and
world trade, to be among the world’s wealthiest, strongest, and most
developed democracies in the world.162 Yet, twenty-one of the twenty-

162. The reason why not all OECD states appear in this Article’s list of fifty-nine strong
democratic states is due to the fact that OECD membership is voluntary and because it is focused
on countries with strong economies. This Article’s rubric was entirely focused on regime type
or political system (democracy) and nothing more, unlike the OECD, which abides by a different
membership criterion.
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eight OECD states that made my list, nearly seventy-two percent, have
adopted at least one restrictive CSO law (See Figure 9).

Among the remaining thirty-two states that are not members of
the OECD, only fifteen of these states, nearly forty-seven percent, have
adopted at least one restrictive CSO law, making the top tier OECD
democracies (in my case selection) even more likely than the lower tier
group to adopt a restrictive CSO law. This Article’s findings contradict,
or cast doubt on, existing studies on the OECD countries that tend to
assume that this elite club of states has uniformly strong and permissive
CSO legal frameworks in place.163
Moreover, many of the countries typically included or cited as the
highest performers with respect to the freedom of association or the
robustness of their civil society sectors, appear on my list of those
democratic countries that have adopted restrictive CSO laws. A recent
survey found Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Latvia, Estonia and
Slovenia to be among the top ten percent of performers on their respect
and protection for the freedoms of association and assembly; and
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland,
Belgium, Greece and Slovenia to be among the very top performers on

163. See e.g. Elizabeth Bloodgood, Joannie Tremblay-Boire, & Aseem Prakash, National
Styles of NGO Regulation, 43 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q., 716 (2014).
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a measurement of Civil Society Participation. 164 Such top performers
consistently appear in other civil society indexes and measurements as
well. 165 Yet, at least eight of these high-ranked and highly regarded
countries have adopted at least one law imposing new restrictions on
CSOs since the turn of the twenty-first century, with most of these laws
being enacted in or after 2015. Only three of these highly-ranked states
have not imposed new legal restrictions on their civil society sector:
Sweden, Slovenia, and Estonia.166 Moreover, as previously stated, each
of the countries the Author reviewed is a signatory of the key human
rights treaty codifying the freedom of association, the ICCPR, which
constitutes binding international law. Yet, in keeping with recent
research, treaty ratification status does not, on its own, appear to
influence a state’s willingness to infringe on the freedom of association
by proposing or adopting a restrictive CSO law. 167
VII. WHY DOES IT MATTER THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS REMAIN NON-GOVERNMENTAL?
Having reviewed the data and determining that well over half—a
shocking sixty-three percent—of the world’s strongest democratic
states have proposed or adopted a restrictive CSO law since 1990, with
the vast majority being adopted in the last five years, we must ask the
question: so why do restrictions imposed on CSOs’ autonomy even
matter, and are they all uniformly inappropriate? The answer to the
second question is simple: no. A certain level of government oversight
over the CSO sector is appropriate and typical. CSOs wanting to enjoy
certain state benefits, such as the right to open a bank account or use
the court system to resolve disputes in its organizational name, to
obtain tax benefits and exemptions, or to apply for federal grants
should, in exchange for receiving these benefits, submit to a system of
164. Silva-Leande, Annika, & Noonan, Is the Space for Civil Society Shrinking? INT’L
IDEA (July 17, 2018), https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/space-civil-society-reallyshrinking [https://perma.cc/Z6SH-Y7EW].
165. E.g., Worldmap 2019, supra note 107.
166. Note that the Author did not include Latvia in this review of “strong democratic
states.”
167. See generally DEMATTEE, supra note 16; Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935 (2002) [hereinafter Hathaway 2002]. PhD
Candidate Anthony DeMattee found, in a recent study, that ratification of human rights treaties
does not prevent the adoption of laws infringing on the freedom of association without
constitutional rules specifically making treaties equivalent to ordinary legislation, meaning that
they become automatically binding upon ratification.
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minimal state oversight. For example, a CSO wishing to obtain a
specific tax exemption applicable to nonprofit organizations engaged
in poverty reduction work should have to submit to annual audits to
confirm that they are legitimately engaged in this type of work. CSOs
wishing to receive state benefits should be expected to go through a
formal registration process, which enters their name and basic
information into a centralized database, which is publically
accessible. 168 Yet, this process should be minimal, affordable or ideally
free of charge, fast, and simple to complete; it should not impose
onerous requirements, hefty fees, long waiting times, or allow for
denials except in only extreme and identifiable situations, and if denials
are permitted, a right to appeal the decision to a neutral arbiter, or
ideally an independent judicial court, should be afforded. 169 The CSO
registration process should, in effect, be a notification system designed
more to facilitate the public’s knowledge of the existing pool of CSOs
that are receiving taxpayer dollars, than to create a vehicle for
government oversight and control. If a CSO does not wish to receive
state benefits, registration with the state should be voluntary and the
government should have almost little to no involvement in their affairs,
naturally barring criminal or otherwise unlawful activity.
A. International Human Rights Law, The Freedom of Association &
Democratic Theory
The first question posed above is harder to answer and implicates
both international human rights law and democratic theory. First, the
right for CSOs to form and operate free from government restrictions
is rooted in the freedom of association, a fundamental human right
enshrined in a variety of international legal instruments, including:
Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22 of
the ICCPR, Article 24 of The Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article
10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 16
of the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 11 of the
European Convention on Human rights, among others. 170 According to
168. See Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organizations (Leon E. Irish, Robert
Kushen, & Karla W. Simon eds., 2004).
169. See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (May
21, 2012).
170. This right is also recognized in various International Labor Organization
conventions, as well as the founding charters and constitutions of nations around the world, such
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the ICCPR, a foundational international human rights treaty ratified by
167 countries around the world,
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others . . . No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this
right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection
of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others . . . . 171

According to human rights attorneys, restrictions on the freedom
to associate are presumptively impermissible under international law
unless the restriction fulfills three strict conditions, namely that the
restriction is: (1) prescribed by law; (2) considered necessary in a
democratic society; and (3) adopted in furtherance of one of four
permissible justifications, which include: national security/public
safety; public order; protection of public health or morals; or protection
of others’ rights and freedoms. The freedom of association has been
further interpreted by international human rights law as requiring states
to issue “convincing and compelling reasons” any time a restriction,
however small, is placed on the right to associate, and that the
restriction is strictly “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”172
Moreover, in determining whether a restriction is permissible, “it is
important to consider whether or not there are less intrusive means
available to accomplish the desired end.” 173 Theoretically, every
restriction placed on the freedom of association by a state actor, which
includes any new law or regulation that imposes a new requirement or
that subtracts from their previous level of autonomy, should first go
through this legal analysis in order to determine its permissibility under
international law.
The reality, of course, is that states often do not go through this
legal analysis and instead, ignore their obligations under international
human rights law. Many studies by both legal scholars and political
scientists confirm that states do not take their human rights obligations
as Article 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which identifies the right to
association as a “fundamental freedom”.
171. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at
http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-covenant/ [https://perma.cc/SL8M-ZE98] [hereinafter
ICCPR].
172. Case of Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 500 at 40 (1998).
173. E.g., Id. at 24-25.
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seriously and that ratifying a human rights treaty has little to no effect
on their behavior. 174 Indeed, some studies go further, suggesting that
ratifications can lead states to engage in worse behavior than before,
and more relevant to this Article’s inquiry, that they can compel states
to impose additional restrictions on their civil society sectors,
particularly their human rights and advocacy organizations, as to
prevent them from publicizing their human rights violations. 175 More
often, however, at least in my own experience as a human rights
attorney and in my research for this project, states harness the language
of human rights law to justify their preferred restrictions on CSOs. For
example, when passing a law that imposes new funding restrictions or
that limits the scope of activities that CSOs can engage in, the proposer
of the new law typically justifies the law’s passage in the name of
national security or some version of public order, such as the need for
increased transparency and accountability.
B. The Connection between CSOs’ Autonomy and Democracy
It is well established that civil society and civic engagement are
prerequisites for a well-functioning democracy. 176 Scholars and
theorists of democracy, including perhaps the most famous of all
democracy observers, the French political historian Alexis de
Tocqueville, have long noticed that where democracy flourishes, so too
does an autonomous civil society sector. 177 In Tocqueville’s attempt to
understand the sources of America’s strong democratic values and
institutions he pointed first and foremost to one thing: America’s
unmatched network of non-governmental associations. According to
Tocqueville, nothing is “more deserving of our attention” than
understanding the “art” of civic associations, the “mother of science,”
the explanation for “the most democratic country on the face of the
earth,” and the foundation upon which “the progress of all the rest
depends.” 178 For Tocqueville, independent civic associations were the
source of democracy’s strength, the spark that led to its existence and
the fuel that kept it running; they were both an essential precursor to
174. See Hathaway 2002, supra note 164, at 1976-88; Eric Neumayer, Do International
Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, J. CON. RES. 49(6), 925–53 (2005).
175. E.g., Bakke, Mitchell, & Smidt 2018, supra note 130.
176. E.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1840) [hereinafter
TOCQUEVILLE 1840].
177. Id.
178. Id. Vol. 1, at 195.
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democracy’s taking root and the essential ingredient for its
continuation. Without a robust and diversified network of
nongovernmental civic associations, democracy, in Tocqueville’s
view, would wither, fade, and eventually implode upon itself; it would
fall prey, in his words, to “the despotism of faction,” 179 “the arbitrary
power of a prince,” 180 and in time, “the most galling tyranny.” 181
While perhaps no one has ever spoken with as much elegance
about the necessary linkage between CSOs’ autonomy and democracy
than Tocqueville, other theorists and renown political figures have
spoken with equal conviction on the topic. Robert Dahl, for example,
considered by many to be the father of modern political science and
whose widely cited definition of democracy (or what he referred to as
polyarchy) established him as a towering voice on this topic, designated
the freedom of association as one of the key institutional requisites for
an electoral democracy; without this freedom, he claimed, elections
risked becoming mere charades. 182 For Dahl, one of the “procedural
minimum” requirements for a country to qualify as a political
democracy is that its citizens “have the right to form relatively
independent associations or organizations . . . ,” a contention that
numerous other scholars have agreed with. 183 In later publications,
Dahl became even more insistent on the need for CSOs to have
“associational autonomy,” which he viewed as essential to a wellfunctioning democracy. 184 Without granting the right of civic
associations the freedom to operate free from government interference
or control, they cannot perform their core job, which they alone are
uniquely poised to do, namely to hold elected officials accountable, or
put another way, to operate as independent and autonomous watchdogs
over the political system.
American political scientist Robert Putnam, in his well-known
bestseller Bowling Alone, similarly connects the robustness of a state’s
civil society sector with the strength of that state’s democracy. 185
179. Id. Chapter XIV.
180. Id. Chapter XII.
181. Id.
182. ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 130-31 (1989) [hereinafter DAHL
1989].
183. E.g., Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not,
2 J. DEM. 75, 81 (1991) [hereinafter Schmitter & Karl 1991].
184. DAHL 1989, supra note 179, at 130-31.
185. See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
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Focusing on the US context specifically, he connects the sharp decrease
in the number of American civic associations over the years with
declines in American democracy, a connection made more broadly by
British historian Niall Ferguson, who contends that history’s greatest
nations were built on the backs of civil society associations, and
conversely, that these nations’ downfalls can be explained by the
diminishment and weakening of those associations. 186 The literature on
democratic transitions similarly confirms the powerful role played by
civil society in the emergence of new democracies; indeed, this
extensive body of literature reveals that a mobilized civil society sector
is often the “critical actor” in a country’s “breakthrough to
democracy.” 187
Political scientists coming from an entirely different perspective
as Putnam and Ferguson, namely from a constructivist point of view
which focuses more on the power of ideas and non-state actors in
shaping world politics, have reached similar conclusions.
Constructivists Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett, for example,
have argued for the importance of international organizations to have
autonomy from state control, and author Fareed Zakaria, whose
eclectic ideas make him difficult to categorize, describes civil society
associations as “essential” to the “maintenance of a liberal
democracy.” 188 Economists have reached this conclusion as well,
though their attention has been more focused on ascertaining what
factors make a country wealthy, long-lasting, and strong.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology-based economist Daron
Acemoglu and his co-author, political scientist James Robinson, in
their 2012 book Why Nations Fail marshal an extraordinary volume of
historical evidence from medieval to modern times to make an
institutionalist argument that the rise and fall of nations is determined
by whether a nation has a network of “inclusive institutions,” which
ensure that the state is taking into account the opinions of its citizens.189
186. See generally NIALL FERGUSON, supra note 1.
187. E.g., Michael Bernhard & Ekrem Karakoc, Civil Society and the Legacies of
Dictatorship, 59 WORLD POL. 539, 542 (2007).
188. Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 699-732 (1999); Sean Illing, Fareed Zakaria
Made a Scary Prediction about Democracy in 1997 — and It’s Coming True, VOX (Jan. 18,
2017),
https://www.vox.com/conversations/2017/1/18/14250364/democracy-liberalismdonald-trump-populism-fareed-zakaria-europe-fascism [https://perma.cc/W767-42CV].
189. Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, What Are Institutions¸ WHY NATIONS FAIL
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://whynationsfail.com/blog/2013/10/29/what-are-institutions.html
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Empirical studies also make implicit, but obvious, connections between
the strength of a democracy and the autonomy of its civil society sector.
In a study examining the state of democracy worldwide from 1971 to
2017, the authors found that in countries where democratic institutions
were de-consolidating, the freedom of association was weak and
restricted by the state. 190
Democracy theorists conclude that the presence of an autonomous
civil society sector is what makes elections, the most visible and, some
argue, among the most essential elements of a democracy,
meaningful. 191 In states where elections are held but civil society is
weak, which some refer to as an “illiberal democracy,” elected officials
with authoritarian leanings tend to entrench themselves in power and
rule autocratically, such as in Russia, Malaysia, and Cambodia.192
CSOs, when allowed to operate independently and autonomous from
government control, give voice to the voiceless, advocate issues of
public concern, hold elected and campaigning officials to account, help
to mobilize voters, and create platforms for shared grievances. To be
sure, elements of civil society are not always progressive, helpful, or
indeed even ‘civil’ in their rhetoric; indeed, under my definition, which
excludes organizations or groups that engage in violence but does not
exclude groups on the basis of their agendas, the birther movement in
the United States, neo-Nazis, elements of the far-right, and groups that
form to fight the teaching of evolution in schools are just as much a
part of ‘civil society’ as parent-teacher associations, Green Peace, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Girl Scouts, and local garden
clubs. 193
The ability to form into groups of whatever variety, based on the
wishes, concerns or shared ideals of its members, is, like free speech, a
right that should generally be permitted irrespective of the substantive
[https://perma.cc/B4QF-JB7A]; see generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY
NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY (2012).
190. Anna Lührmann et. al. State of the World 2017: Autocratization and Exclusion? 25
J. DEMOCRATIZATION 8 (2018).
191.
Robert Dahl, The Past and Future of Democracy, CENTER FOR STUDY POL.
CHANGE, 11 (1999), available at http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ_5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FAL5-WHBT].
192. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec.
1997),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-democracy
[https://perma.cc/3UB4-FUU5].
193. Thomas Carothers, Civil Society: Think Again, Foreign Policy, Winter 1999-2000,
at 20 (stating that “[r]ecognizing that people in any society associate and work together to
advance nefarious as well as worth ends is critical to demystifying the concept of civil society.”).
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content or focus of any individual group. So long as the group does not
engage in criminal activity and is otherwise law-abiding, they should,
in theory, be permitted to operate no matter their mission or cause.
Analogizing once again to free speech, while the right to associate is
not and should not be unlimited,194 allowing individuals to coalesce on
the basis of shared goals, no matter what those goals are, is essential
because allowing otherwise could be a slippery slope toward
government censorship. 195 Just as many individuals, particularly in the
American context, would be uncomfortable with the idea of the
government determining the content of their public expressions, so too,
are there legitimate concerns about the government deciding which
CSOs should and should not be permitted to exist. Moreover, like free
speech, allowing individuals to form into groups for whatever reason
provides them with a non-violent way to vent and express their views,
which if contained or repressed, could simmer and then explode into
acts of violence. Most importantly of all perhaps, allowing groups to
form for any purpose absent violence or criminality, is an expression
of democracy in its purest sense of the term: it allows citizens to express
and enact their personal views, no matter those views, in order to shape
their own polity in the ways they wish. CSOs create a bridge between
citizens and their elected officials; they operate as a middle-man,
transmitting concerns and messages louder and with greater effect than
any individual could ever hope to do on their own. As such, when their
autonomy to form and operate is constrained, civil society is not able
to perform this democracy promoting and maintaining purpose,
arguably its most critical function in a democratic state.

194. In the US context, where the right to free speech is considered to be the most
protected in the world, there are still exceptions. Individuals are not permitted to incited actions
that would harm others (Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919)), to make or distribute
obscene materials (Roth v. United States, 354 US 476, 483 (1957)), to burn draft cards as an
anti-war protest (United States v. O’Brien, 391 US 367, 371 (1968)), and a variety of other
exceptions. As with free speech, the right to associate and form into groups is not unlimited, it
can properly be constrained in a variety of contexts, which tend to parallel those areas where
speech can appropriately be restricted.
195. Note that there are opponents, including liberal opponents, to the view that speech
should be generally permitted no matter its substance. See, e.g., Nathan J. Robinson, Thinking
Strategically about Freed Speech and Violence, CURRENT AFFAIRS (Aug. 20, 2017),
https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/08/thinking-strategically-about-free-speech-and-violence
[https://perma.cc/5VQV-7H72]. Robinson, like others, argues that free speech when allowed
unrestrained only increases the likelihood of violence. Some argue, for example, that the Antifa
movement in the United States, due to its radicalized anti-right language,
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The Author’s research findings confirm a claim that has routinely
been alleged by civil society activists, human rights attorneys and a
small handful of political scientists, but until now, never empirically
confirmed or explored. 196 As such, the research and activist
communities can now rightfully assert, and with full and documented
proof, that the closing space trend has indeed spread into democratic
states, including the world’s strongest democratic states, just as it has
done in authoritarian-leaning states and states with mixed regime
types. 197 Moreover, the Author’s findings confirm that this spread is a
very recent twenty-first-century phenomenon that seems to have taken
off after 2005, gained momentum in 2010, and then reached its peak in
2016-2017. Though it is still too early to tell whether these trend lines
will continue in the coming years, and if the remaining twenty-five
strong democracies that have not yet imposed a new restrictive CSO
law will so do in the near term, what is clear is that the rate as which
such laws are being adopted or proposed in democratic states (sixtythree percent to date) is keeping pace with, or according to some
estimates, even rising above the percentages seen in less democratic
states. 198
The implications of this Article’s findings are potentially
profound if the effects of restrictive CSO laws in non-democratic states
are any guide. In Ethiopia, for example, domestic human rights CSOs
all but vanished in the years following passage of an extremely
restrictive CSO law, the Charities and Societies Proclamation of
2009. 199 In Azerbaijan, following passage of a series of restrictive CSO
regulations in 2013-2014, which imposed additional administrative
barriers and burdens on CSOs and their funders, most independent
advocacy CSOs scaled down, discontinued their work, or left the
country altogether. 200 In Russia, following passage of the Foreign
Agents Law in 2012, which requires CSOs that receive any foreign
196. Michelle Reddy, Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? Neighbourhood Effects
of Foreign Funding Restrictions to NGOs, 13 ST. ANTHONY’S INT’L REV. 109-41 (2018).
197. Id.
198. DUPUY et al., HANDS OFF MY REGIME, supra note 6 at 7-8; Christensen & Weinstein
2013, supra note 123 79-83.
199. DUPUY et al., HANDS OFF MY REGIME, supra note 6.
200. Durna Safarova, Azerbaijan: Suffocation of NGOs Raises Questions About Donor
Strategy, EURASIANET, (Oct. 10, 2017), https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-suffocation-of-ngosraises-questions-about-donor-strategy [https://perma.cc/C5LB-LK3V].
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donations and are engaged in vaguely defined “political” be labeled as
“foreign agents,” a label akin to foreign espionage in the Russian
context, 201 has led many CSOs, particularly those engaged in human
rights and government accountability, to self-censor, limit their scope
of activities, or voluntarily dissolve. 202 Recent reports suggest that over
a third of Russia’s CSOs have stopped operating, with many choosing
to voluntarily dissolve rather than face the stigma associated with the
foreign agent label or the costs associated with challenging the label in
court. 203 In Bangladesh, recent reports suggest that in the wake of the
2016 Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Bill’s
passage, a restrictive CSO law that places tight constraints on CSOs’
ability to receive foreign funds, many CSOs, particularly smaller ones,
have been forced to shut down due to insufficient funding, while the
registration rates of new CSOs have dramatically declined. 204 These are
just a few of the many examples. And these examples are not irrelevant
to democratic states; multiple reports have suggested linkages or
similarities between restrictive CSO laws passed in India, Hungary and
elsewhere with Russia’s foreign agent law. 205
Though we know less about the impact of restrictive CSO laws in
democratic states, an emerging body of empirical evidence suggests
that such laws are having similar, even if less severe, consequences in
democracies too. In India, for example, recent reports confirm that
more than 24,000 CSOs lost their operating licenses following adoption
of new, more restrictive amendments to the Foreign Contributions
201. Helen Simpson, Russia’s Foreign Agent Law: An HPR Explainer, HARV. POL.
REV., (Nov. 30, 2017), https://harvardpolitics.com/world/russias-foreign-agent-law-an-hprexplainer/ [https://perma.cc/4TG6-KCTM].
202. Nils Muižnieks, The Shrinking Space for Human Rights Organisations,
Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe, Apr. 4, 2017.
203. Charles Digges, ‘Foreign Agent’ Law Has Put 33 Percent of Russia’s NGOs out of
Business, BELLONA (Oct. 20, 2015), https://bellona.org/news/russian-human-rightsissues/russian-ngo-law/2015-10-foreign-agent-law-has-put-33-percent-of-russias-ngos-out-ofbusiness [https://perma.cc/Z8KJ-D485]; Alexei Kozlov, Russia’s ‘Foreign Agents’ Law Is
Bankrupting Campaigners and Activists, OPENDEMOCRACY (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russias-foreign-agents-law/ [https://perma.cc/AT9A4DUD].
204. Islam Shariful, Screws Tighten on NGOs, CITIZENS PLATFORM FOR SDGS (Oct. 26,
2017), https://bdplatform4sdgs.net/screws-tighten-ngos/ [https://perma.cc/9EJA-WCT9].
205. Yasmeen Serhan, Hungary’s Anti-Foreign NGO Law, ATLANTIC (June 13, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/hungarys-anti-foreign-ngo-law/530121/
[https://perma.cc/G3C9-PBQP]; Foreign Funding of NGOs: Donors: Keep Out, ECONOMIST
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.economist.com/international/2014/09/12/donors-keep-out
[https://perma.cc/HV2R-WCNK].
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Regulation Act in 2010 and 2011. 206 The new amendments prohibit any
organizations of “a political nature” from receiving external assistance
and grant the government broad authority in prohibiting any CSO from
receiving foreign contributions when deemed “detrimental to the
national interest.” 207 In Turkey, which is perhaps an unfair example
because of the current political context, a series of executive decrees
following the failed coup in 2016 granted the government broad
authority to dissolve and control the actions of CSOs. Under these
decrees, more than 1,400 CSOs were involuntarily shut down by
government order. 208
CSOs are not the only ones affected by restrictive CSO
legislation. Also at stake is global democracy. Recent research suggests
that democracy is on the wane around the globe. For thirteen straight
years, Freedom House catalogued declines in global freedoms in its
2019 report, with established democracies dominating the list of
countries reflecting setbacks. Countries labeled free accounted for a
larger share of the declines than at any time in the past decade, and
nearly one-quarter of the countries experiencing declines were in
Europe. This stands in stark juxtaposition to earlier times; from 1975
to 2005, Freedom House recorded nearly thirty years of constant gains.
The Economist’s Democracy Index, while a bit more optimistic, found
evidence in their most recent report of ongoing and deepening
disillusionment with democracy and dwindling numbers of people
living under some form of democratic governance. Indeed, it found that
only four and half percent of the human population lives in a full
democracy. Although disputed by some, these findings are supported
by a growing body of scholars and policy analysts focused on
democratic decay around the globe. Better understanding of when and
why democratic states impose additional restraints on their civil society
sectors might also be critical to the preservation of democracy around
the world. Recent research suggests that democracy is on the wane
around the globe. For thirteen straight years in a row, Freedom House
206. Melissa Cyrill & Adam Pitman, FCRA Compliance in India: How 24,000 NGOs
Lost Their License, INDIA BRIEFING, (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.indiabriefing.com/news/fcra-compliance-india-how-24000-ngos-lost-their-license-15287.html/
[https://perma.cc/L86B-NUUB].
207. WOLFF & POPPE 2015, supra note 1, at 19; CHAUDHRY 2016, supra note 90, at 62–
63.
208. William Armstrong, Interview: Max Hoffman on Turkish Civil Society under Siege,
HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/interview-maxhoffman-on-turkish-civil-society-under-siege-116322 [https://perma.cc/88N3-93RR].
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catalogued declines in global freedoms in its 2019 report, with
established democracies dominating the list of countries reflecting
setbacks. 209 Countries labeled free accounted for a larger share of the
declines than at any time in the past decade, and nearly one-quarter of
the countries experiencing declines were in Europe. This new reality
stands in stark juxtaposition to earlier times; from 1975 to 2005,
Freedom House recorded nearly thirty years of constant gains. 210 The
Economist’s Democracy Index, while a bit more optimistic, found
evidence in their most recent report of ongoing and deepening
disillusionment with democracy and dwindling numbers of people
living under some form of democratic governance; indeed, it found that
only four and a half percent of the human population lives in a full
democracy. 211 Though disputed by some, 212 these findings are
supported by a growing body of scholars and policy analysts focused
on democratic decay around the globe. 213
Perhaps the closing space trend, and specifically its spread into
strong democratic states, is partly what is fueling this decline in global
democracy, or perhaps, the decline in global democracy is fueling the
closing space trend. Multiple scholars who support the democratic
decay thesis have decried the lack of conceptual tools necessary for
identifying the “early warning signs” that such decay is underway, as
well as the lack of understanding of “the series of discrete and
interconnected events and actions that often proceed undetected, of
democratic backsliding.” 214 At least one such scholar has pointed to the
adoption of “ever-more expansive laws empowering the state to
maintain law and order” as one such early warning sign. 215

209. Freedom House 2019.
210. Mark Goldberg, When Soft Power Salutes Despots, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 14,
2017), https://prospect.org/power/soft-power-salutes-despots/ [https://perma.cc/DL9P-3ZJ8].
211. The United States, as just one example, is no longer characterized as a “full
democracy.” It was downgraded from its status as a “full” to a “flawed” democracy for the first
time in the Index’s history in 2016. The EIU Democracy Index 2018, World Democracy Report,
available at https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index [https://perma.cc/7NSY-QYYD].
212. Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, J. DEMOCRACY 5–19 (Jan. 2016),
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/on-democratic-backsliding/
[https://perma.cc/5VVE-YADV].
213. See generally Tom Daly, Diagnosing Democratic Decay, Comparative
Constitutional Law Roundtable, Gilbert & Tobin Centre of Public Law, UNSW SYDNEY; Aziz
Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018).
214. Horowitz & Macdonald, supra note 73; Daly, supra note 209.
215. Horowitz & Macdonald, supra note 73.
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The Author’s findings offer the possibility of doing both:
identifying an early warning sign that democratic decay is indeed
underway and identifying one of the typically undetected
interconnected events that is fueling democratic backsliding. Future
research building upon the findings presented in this Article,
particularly by legal scholars who have the skills and tools necessary
to engage in the detailed and nuanced textual legal analysis required in
tracking this trend, will, the Author hopes, help to further demystify
this puzzling and consequential twenty-first century global
phenomenon. Given that this phenomenon threatens to reverse the postCold war optimism in the power and spread of democracy, and with it,
the power and spread of civil society’s associational revolution, the
stakes are high and the need for further and deeper understanding is
urgent.
Appendix 1: List of Strong Democratic Countries
Albania

Ecuador

*Lithuania

*Portugal

*Australia

Estonia

*Luxembourg

Romania

*Austria

*Finland

Macedonia

*Slovakia

*Belgium

France

Madagascar

*Slovenia

Bolivia

*Germany

*Mauritius

South Africa

Bulgaria

Greece

Moldova

*Spain

*Canada

*Hungary

*Mongolia

*Sweden

*Cape Verde

*Iceland

Montenegro

*Switzerland

*Chile

India

*Netherlands

*Taiwan

Comoros

*Ireland

*New Zealand

Thailand

*Costa Rica

*Israel

Nicaragua

*Trinidad & Tobago

Croatia

*Italy

*Norway

*United Kingdom

*Cyprus

Jamaica

Panama

*United States

*Czech Republic

*Japan

Peru

*Uruguay

*Denmark

Kenya

*Poland

*Designates membership in the OECD, which are regarded as the
most economically and politically powerful countries in the world.

